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ARTICLES
STOPPING FETAL ABUSE WITH NO-
PREGNANCY AND DRUG TREATMENT
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Janet W. Steverson*
Born 12 weeks premature to a woman who had been
shooting cocaine into her body all during her pregnancy,
the baby weighed 1 pound, 12 ounces at birth. At 9 days
old, his intestines ruptured in two places, requiring hours
of surgery and leaving the child with an egg-sized colos-
tomy bag pinned to his stomach. Meanwhile, nearly mi-
croscopic blood vessels in his head had begun to hemor-
rhage. He required sedation almost from the minute he
was born to relieve his almost constant tremors and
tears.1
Before becoming healthy and productive individuals, the
current generation of American children will have to face and
survive a host of dangers. This task will be more or less diffi-
cult, depending upon the circumstances of each child. If,
however, someone "stacks the deck" against a child before he
or she is ever born, this child's task will be infinitely more
difficult. When an addicted woman conceives a child, her use
of drugs2 and the circumstances of her being an addict "stack
the deck" against her developing child. She enormously mag-
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1. Bob Hill, The Littlest Addicts, COURIER J., Jan. 21, 1990, at 10M.
2. The term "drugs" is meant to encompass alcohol as well as licit and il-
licit drugs.
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nifies the difficulties that her child must overcome in order to
become a healthy and productive individual.
This "stacking of the deck" occurs through a variety of
factors. It occurs because drug use, in and of itself, can cause
serious physical harm to a developing child.' This harm
ranges from withdrawal symptoms to death.4 The "stacking
of the deck" also occurs because drug use is, in many ways,
detrimental to the health of the mother, which is also detri-
mental to a developing child.5 In addition, it occurs because
an addicted person is unlikely to obtain proper prenatal care,
which is needed to better ensure healthy children.6 The com-
bination of these factors means that the drug-affected child, if
it survives, often has a variety of special needs, including
physical and developmental disabilities.' If these special
needs are met, while the road may still be more difficult, the
child's chances of developing "normally" may increase.' Un-
fortunately, an addicted woman is often unable to meet the
needs of her children, and the overburdened child protection
system is ill-equipped to remedy that deficit. Further, a child
born to an addicted woman may continue to be harmed be-
cause his or her mother's continued drug abuse often leads to
abandonment, abuse, or neglect.9
As of 1991, it was estimated that 500,000 to 700,000
newborns were annually exposed to illicit drugs in utero.10 If
these estimates are accurate, then by the end of 1993, at least
1.5 million children" will have had their life's opportunities
seriously diminished by their mother's drug use. What is ex-
traordinary is that this number does not include the millions
of children who have been and will be exposed to alcohol in
utero. 12
3. See infra text accompanying notes 43-65.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 32-87.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 66-87.
6. See infra note 82.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-118.
8. See infra note 106.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 119-139.
10. See infra text accompanying note 140.
11. This number is reached by multiplying 500,000 newborns per year by
three years.
12. See Phoebe Rinkel, Myths and Stereotypes About Long-Term Effects of
Prenatal Alcohol and Other Drug Exposure (PADE), PERINATAL ADDICTION RES.
& EDUC. UPDATE, June, 1992, at 1 (in a 1991 study, the National Institute of
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism estimated that "women were 16 times more
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In section I, the consequences of prenatal drug exposure
are explored in great detail. 13 An in-depth discussion is nec-
essary in order to grasp the gravity and enormity of the con-
sequences of prenatal drug exposure. This in-depth discus-
sion is also needed in order to demonstrate that prenatal
drug exposure is a serious and complex problem requiring a
multidimensional solution. As outlined in Section II of this
article, 14 many commentators have written on the subject of
how society should address the problem of harm caused to
children by in utero drug exposure. 5 Some have proposed
punishment of pregnant substance abusers,1 6 others have
sought to protect the child after birth by removing her from
the custody of her mother,' and still others have proposed
treatment and help for pregnant substance abusers.' While
some of the proposals can and should be implemented, none
adequately address the crucial and fundamental issue: what
can society do now to protect children from in utero drug ex-
posure so that the numbers of such exposures will begin to
significantly decline?
Although some states have established programs
designed to provide assistance for such women, 19 substance-
abusing women continue to conceive numerous children who
are harmed in utero. 0 Thus, while this author agrees that it
is wrong as a matter of social policy to "focus on maternal
misbehavior in isolation from the problems afflicting poor wo-
men,"21 she posits that society cannot sacrifice its children
while trying to address the myriad problems afflicting sub-
stance-abusing women. In addition, one must recognize that
a large number of pregnant substance-abusers will not volun-
likely to have used alcohol as cocaine during the pregnancy"); see also generally
Ann Pytkowicz Streissguth et al., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Adolescents and
Adults, 266 JAMA 1961, 1966 (1991) (the prevalence rate for Fetal Alcohol Syn-
drome in Seattle, Washington is one in about 700 live births, and the minimal
prevalence rates on Indian reservations in the Southwest United States range
from one in 97 to one in 750 live births).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 28-157.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 157-261.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 157-261.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 204-215.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 250-254.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 159-163.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 163, 172.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 140-157.
21. Nancy Gertner, Women v. Fetus, BOSTON B.J., July-Aug. 1990, at 27.
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tarily seek treatment for their addiction.2 2 Therefore, a
somewhat coercive legislative solution that is designed to pro-
tect as many children as possible from prenatal drug expo-
sure as soon as possible is proposed in Section III.23 Under
the proposed legislation, states would make it a crime for
anyone to abuse alcohol, licit substances, or illicit substances
while pregnant.2 4 Since, however, the state will achieve its
goal of maximum protection for children only if it assists
rather than punishes the mothers,25 a woman who commits
the crime should not be incarcerated if at all possible.
Rather, if the woman gives birth to a drug-affected child and
is convicted of the crime of criminal fetal abuse, the judge
should give her a choice of prison or probation. If she chooses
probation, two mandatory conditions of her probation should
be obtaining drug treatment and not getting pregnant. Once
the woman has begun to control her addiction, the no-preg-
nancy condition can be dropped. If the woman is pregnant
when she is brought into the system, the judge must sentence
her to civil commitment in a drug rehabilitation center. Fol-
22. See infra text accompanying notes 173-203.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 262-322.
24. From the perspective of this article, the problems of use and abuse of
cocaine, other illicit drugs, licit drugs, or alcohol by pregnant women are inter-
connected, and therefore any legislative solution must encompass all types of
substance use and abuse. In the interest of time and space, however, this arti-
cle concentrates upon the use and abuse of illicit drugs, with special emphasis
upon the use and abuse of cocaine.
One must nat, however, lose sight of the fact that the conclusions reached
in this article concerning the use and abuse of illicit drugs apply equally to the
use and abuse of alcohol. It has been demonstrated that alcohol has a devastat-
ing effect upon the child in utero. Experts recognize fetal alcohol syndrome
(FAS) as the leading known cause of mental retardation in the United States,
surpassing Down's syndrome and spina bifida. See Streissgnth et al., supra
note 13, at 1961. Two thousand scientific reports confirm that "alcohol is a tera-
togenic drug capable of producing lifelong disabilities after intrauterine expo-
sure." Id. "Teratogenic" is defined as "causing disabling effects upon organ de-
velopment." Janet R. Fink, Effects of Crack and Cocaine Upon Infants: A Brief
Review of the Literature, CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 1989, at 2, 3 (citations
omitted). Not all individuals affected by alcohol in utero will develop FAS.
Rather, FAS "represents the severe end of the continuum of disabilities caused
by maternal alcohol use during pregnancy." Streissguth et al., supra note 13, at
1961. Studies reveal, however, that even social drinking can cause some dam-
age in utero. Some of the effects of social drinking include "IQ and achievement
decrements (especially arithmetic), attentional and memory problems, and
learning problems." Id. These effects are less severe than similar effects found
in FAS patients. Id.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 222-249, 270-275.
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lowing the birth of the child, the judge will review the situa-
tion to determine whether probation with its attendant condi-
tions is necessary. The legislation is designed to be used in
conjunction with other programs that focus on assistance for
substance-abusing women and their children. Thus, if this
legislation is to work effectively, the state must allocate re-
sources to provide comprehensive drug treatment centers for
pregnant and non-pregnant women. In addition, the state
must ensure that pregnant women who want to obtain treat-
ment voluntarily can do so.
The solution proposed in Section III raises a number of
legal, constitutional, and policy issues that are addressed in
Sections IV26 and V.27
I. THE PROBLEM OF COCAINE USE BY PREGNANT WOMEN
The use of cocaine28 by pregnant women constitutes a
multi-faceted problem. Such use causes physical harm to the
child in utero, including withdrawal, respiratory problems,
heart problems, congenital deformities, low birth weight,
neurological damage, and death.29 Further, due to the neuro-
logical damage caused by in utero exposure to cocaine, the
child will often have special needs that must be addressed if
the child is to develop properly. 0 Finally, due to the nature
of drug use, many of the mothers cannot, or will not, properly
care for their drug-exposed offspring.3 ' Thus, the children
are often the victims of abuse and neglect.
A. Harm Caused to the Child In Utero by the Mother's Use
of Cocaine
Due to the increased incidence of cocaine use by women
of childbearing age,3 2 much of the recent research in the area
26. See infra text accompanying notes 323-420.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 421-435.
28. The term "cocaine" is also encompasses crack cocaine.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 43-87.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 88-118.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 119-139
32. See Ira J. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 PE-
DIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1403-04 (1988) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Chas-
noff, Drug Use in Pregnancy] (in 1988, "an estimated 20 million Americans
ha[d] tried cocaine at least once, and 5 million us[ed] it on a regular basis, [and]
the number of pregnant cocaine users in the United States ha[d] risen rapidly,
but no figures as to the actual prevalence [were] available").
1994] 299
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of substance abuse has focused on the effects of in utero expo-
sure to cocaine.33 While it is sometimes difficult to isolate the
effects of cocaine because many women use cocaine along
with other harmful substances,34 "with a few exceptions, the
studies have documented that cocaine and crack exposure
places both mothers and infants at risk and that 'almost no
cocaine-exposed baby fully escapes its damaging effects.' "13
In addition, studies show that "minor usage [of cocaine] in the
first trimester, regardless of the amount, frequency or mode
of ingestion, can produce harmful effects."
36
As is explained in more detail below, once a pregnant wo-
man ingests cocaine, it can physically harm the unborn child
in three ways. First, because cocaine freely passes through
the placenta, it directly affects the fetus 37 and can therefore
cause harm through its addictive and teratogenic38 quali-
ties. 39 Second, cocaine can adversely change the fetal envi-
ronment.40 Third, cocaine often has a detrimental effect upon
the pregnant woman, which can adversely affect the develop-
ing fetus.41 Further, any neurological harm that the child
suffers in utero may adversely affect the child's growth and
development after birth.42
1. Physical Harm Caused by Cocaine Passing Through
the Placenta
Since cocaine can pass freely through the placenta to the
child in utero, it can directly harm the fetus through its ad-
33. See, e.g., studies cited infra notes 34-87.
34. See, e.g., Loretta P. Finnegan, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: The New-
born, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING 59, 60 (Ira J. Chasnoff
ed., 1989) (explaining that most drug-addicted women abuse more than one
drug); Louis G. Keith et al., Drug Abuse in Pregnancy, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL,
PREGNANCY AND PARENTING, supra, at 17, 20 ("Only a modest percentage of ad-
dicts abuse one substance to the exclusion of all others.").
35. Fink, supra note 24, at 3 (footnote and citations omitted).
36. Id. at 4 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use
in Pregnancy: Perinatal Outcome, 261 JAMA 1741 (1989)).
37. Id. at 3.
38. "Teratogenic" is defined as "causing disabling effects upon organ devel-
opment." Id. at 3.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 43-58.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 60-65; Fink, supra note 24, at 4.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 66-87.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 88-118.
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dictive and teratogenic qualities.43 When cocaine passes
through the placenta to the unborn child, its addictive quality
can cause the child to become dependent upon the drug.4
Because of this dependence, whenever the child is denied ac-
cess to the drug, whether in utero or upon delivery, he or she
will suffer withdrawal symptoms. 45 These withdrawal symp-
toms include the following: high-pitched crying, sweating,
trembling, irritability, poor feeding, restlessness, upset stom-
ach (including vomiting and diarrhea), and excessive ten-
sion." With cocaine, the "[w]ithdrawal symptoms peak two
to three weeks after delivery but may last four to six
months."47 Since cocaine is so highly addictive, 48 sixty to
ninety percent of the infants who are exposed to cocaine
shortly before birth will suffer withdrawal symptoms after
birth.49
In addition to being addictive, cocaine is also teratogenic.
The teratogenicity of cocaine impedes the proper develop-
ment of the child's organs. 50 Because the child's brain and
other vital organs develop during the first trimester of preg-
nancy, use of cocaine during this period causes the most se-
verely disabling effects to the child.5' Cocaine-exposed in-
fants suffer disproportionately from respiratory distress,
43. Fink, supra note 24, at 3; see also William T. Atkins, Cocaine: The Drug
of Choice, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING, supra note 34, at 91
(stating that cocaine is "one of the most powerfully addicting substances of
human abuse").
44. See Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 32, at 1405.
45. Id. The child will experience withdrawal in utero when the pregnant
woman withdraws from the drug. Id. Withdrawal symptoms after birth occur
"where the mother's last ingestion was close enough to the date of delivery so as
to cause her to experience withdrawal." Fink, supra note 24, at 5.
46. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 32, at 1405; see also Fink,
supra note 24, at 5 (disturbed behavior of a cocaine-exposed infant during the
first several months after birth includes "tremulousness, . . . excessive tension,
irritability, rapid mood swings, ... shunning of eye contact, vomiting, rapid
weight loss and diarrhea"). While withdrawal symptoms from cocaine do not
appear to be as severe as withdrawal from a narcotic such as heroin, the actual
symptoms can be similar. Id.
47. Fink, supra note 24, at 6.
48. Atkins, supra note 43, at 91.
49. Fink, supra note 24, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Cheryl J. Stephens Cherpitel, Infant Outcomes Associated
With Alcohol Consumption and Material Risk, 1989 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS.
265, 274-75 ("[Tlhe first weeks of gestation [are] one of the most teratogenically
vulnerable times for fetal development."); Keith et al., supra note 34, at 24
("The fetus is particularly susceptible to potentially teratogenic effects of drugs
1994] 301
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pulmonary hypertension, abnormal and rapidly changing
heartbeats, and cerebral infarctions.5 2 Further, doctors have
observed congenital deformities such as malformed kidneys
and genitals, lack of two middle fingers, ileal atresia (dead
bowels), neural tube defects, and lack of small intestine.53
While researchers have not yet established a definitive
causal relationship between cocaine ingestion and the above
congenital deformities, 54 they have found an association be-
tween cocaine use and an increase in congenital anomalies.55
In particular, researchers in one study found an increased in-
cidence of skull defects in cocaine-exposed infants.5 6 This in-
creased incidence was consistent with previous studies that
demonstrated "there was a definite period of susceptibility
during development [of cocaine-exposed laboratory mice] to
the occurrence of exencephaly and skeletal defects."57 In fact,
the disabling effects of cocaine may be severe enough to cause
spontaneous abortion or miscarriage.5"
Although a lot of the severe harm to the fetus occurs in
the first trimester due to cocaine's teratogenicity, the inges-
tion of cocaine will continue to harm the fetus as the preg-
nancy progresses.59 As is explained below, this harm results
when the ingestion of cocaine adversely affects both the fetal
environment and the mother's health.
2. Physical Harm Caused When Cocaine Changes the
Fetal Environment
In addition to affecting the fetus directly, cocaine can in-
directly harm the fetus by adversely changing the fetal envi-
ronment. Cocaine has "vasoconstrictive properties,"6" which
means that it can reduce the flow of blood and oxygen to the
during the first eight weeks of pregnancy. This period is critical for normal
embryonic development.").
52. Fink, supra note 24, at 5.
53. Id. See also Ira J. Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and
Children, PERINATAL ADDICTION RES. & EDUC. UPDATE, June 1992, at 5 [herein-
after Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children].
54. Fink, supra note 24, at 5.
55. Keith et al., supra note 34, at 28; see also Nesrin Bingol et al., Ter-
atogenicity of Cocaine in Humans, 110 J. PEDIATRICS 93, 95 (1987).
56. Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 94.
57. Id. at 95.
58. See Fink, supra note 24, at 4.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 60-88.
60. See Keith et al., supra note 34, at 28.
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fetus.61 Studies associate this insufficiency with the follow-
ing problems: retarding in utero growth,62 causing fetal fatal-
ities,63 and causing fetal intolerance to labor.64 In fact, stud-
ies have found low birth weight, below-average length, and
below-average head circumference to be endemic among in-
fants whose mothers used cocaine throughout the
pregnancy.65
3. Indirect Harm to the Child In Utero Caused by the
Mother's Addiction to Cocaine
Cocaine can indirectly place the fetus at risk through its
detrimental effect upon the pregnant woman.66 This detri-
mental effect may cause the pregnant woman to give birth
prematurely.6 7 In addition, cocaine in some way "affects the
tissue of the placenta, weakening its hold on the wall of the
uterus."6" If the damage is severe enough, this weakening
can lead to a condition known as abruptio placentae, which
constitutes a tearing of the placenta from the uterine lining.
69
The separation cuts off oxygen to the fetus and is associated
with a high incidence of stillbirth and brain damage.70 While
the primary cause of abruptio placentae is unknown, some re-
searchers theorize that there is an association between co-
caine-induced maternal hypertension and abruptio
placentae.7 ' One researcher has found that fifty percent of
the abruptio placentae cases that caused fetal death resulted
61. See Fink, supra note 24, at 3; see also Scott N. MacGregor et al., Co-
caine Use During Pregnancy: Adverse Perinatal Outcome, 157 AM. J. OBSTET-
RICS & GYNECOLOGY 686, 689 (1987).
62. See Fink, supra note 24, at 4; MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 689;
Keith et al., supra note 34, at 28.
63. See Fink, supra note 24, at 4; see also Keith et al., supra note 34, at 28
("[Ilt is becoming increasingly obvious that the unique vaso-constrictive proper-
ties of cocaine predispose to early and mid-trimester pregnancy losses.").
64. See MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 689.
65. See Fink, supra note 24, at 4-5; see also Bingol et al., supra note 55, at
94; MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 689.
66. See Fink, supra note 24, at 3-4.
67. See also Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children,
supra note 53, at 5.
68. Id.
69. See Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 94.
70. Id.; see Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children,
supra note 53, at 5.
71. See, e.g., Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 96; Fink, supra note 24, at 4;
MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 689 (explaining that maternal hypertension
may increase the risks of abruptio placentae).
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from maternal hypertension. 72 In addition to causing still-
births and brain damage, abruptio placentae "may precipitate
premature labor [and/or] placental hemorrhage." v3 Some-
times the mother gives birth as early as twenty-four to
twenty-six weeks.74
"Premature infants are at risk for respiratory distress,
low birth weight, delayed development and sudden infant
death syndrome (SIDS)."75 Due in part to the high rate of
prematurity among drug-affected babies, a greatly increased
risk of mortality exists in early infancy; in fact, infant mortal-
ity in some areas "is estimated to be three times higher
among children of substance abusers than others."76  It is
known that low birth weight is a factor in increased rate of
death in the first year. 7  In addition, Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome (SIDS) "is five to ten times more likely to occur
among cocaine-exposed infants than drug-free babies."78
Further, while it has been conclusively demonstrated
that substance use and abuse in and of itself has a damaging
effect upon the fetus,79 additional harm may be caused by
maternal medical problems that often accompany such sub-
stance abuse. "As the addiction worsens, the need to procure
larger quantities of the addictive agent and the need for more
frequent use overwhelms all other considerations of maternal
72. Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 96 (citing Placental Abruption, in Wi.-
LIAMS OBSTETRICS 395-407 (J.A. Pritchard et al. eds., 17th ed. 1985)).
73. Fink, supra note 24, at 4.
74. Id.
75. Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra note
53, at 5.
76. Fink, supra note 24, at 4 (quoting J. Plaut & T. Kelley, CHILDWATCH:
CHILDREN AND DRUGS (1989) (relating to infant mortality in New York City).
77. See Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra
note 53, at 5.
78. Fink, supra note 24, at 4. The Perinatal Center for Chemical Depen-
dence demonstrated that with regard to SIDS, a 15% incidence rate existed
among cocaine-exposed infants as compared to a 4% incidence rate among in-
fants whose mothers used heroin and were then maintained on methadone dur-
ing their pregnancies. Id.
79. See Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 95-96. In a study that took into ac-
count smoking, ethnicity, alcohol abuse, and socioeconomic status, researchers
found that "cocaine abuse by pregnant women significantly reduces birth
weight, increases the stillbirth rate related to abruptio placentae, and is associ-
ated with an increased congenital malformation rate." Id. at 96. In addition,
the study demonstrated that drug use in general significantly reduces "[b]irth
weight, length, and head circumference." Id. at 93.
304 [Vol. 34
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health and fetal well-being... "80 Thus, abusers often live in
poverty due to the financial requirements of a heavy addic-
tion.8 ' In addition, many abusers suffer from poor prenatal
care,82 and "poorly timed pregnancies." 83 Many abusers also
do not receive adequate nutrition.84 This malnutrition gener-
ally stems from a cocaine-induced loss of appetite,8 5 and it
can adversely affect the developing fetus.8 6 Finally, since
many drug users share contaminated needles and engage in
frequent unprotected sexual activity, the fetuses of drug-us-
ing women are exceptionally vulnerable to sexually transmit-
ted and infectious diseases, especially syphilis and AIDS.
87
B. After-Birth Problems Associated With Physical Damage
Caused to the Child by In Utero Exposure
The harm to the unborn child that cocaine causes leads
to other possible continuing problems for the drug-exposed
infant. These continuing problems flow from the physical dis-
abilities previously discussed. Of particular significance is
the neurological damage that in utero exposure to cocaine can
cause.8 8 Because of this physical damage, a large number of
cocaine-exposed infants will have special needs that their
80. MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 689; see also Finnegan, supra note
34, at 60 (stating that "the majority of drug-dependent women neglect general
health care").
81. MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 689.
82. Cocaine users have a serious and pervasive problem with lack of prena-
tal care. Fink, supra note 24, at 7. Studies demonstrate that such women are
four times less likely than other women to obtain prenatal care. Id.; see also
Keith et al., supra note 34, at 19, 24 ("The constant and recurring need to self
medicate may interfere with regular clinic attendance. Unless the patient is
enrolled in a highly structured program with a well-developed follow-up compo-
nent, poor or non-existant [sic] care is the rule ... [and] as many as 50-60% of
addicts receive no prenatal care whatsoever."). This lack of prenatal care exa-
cerbates an already high risk of low birth weight and infant mortality. Fink,
supra note 24, at 7.
83. Kathleen Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose
Crimes? What Punishment?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1990, at 13, 19.
84. See Fink, supra note 24, at 7.
85. See Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra
note 53, at 5; see also Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 95; Keith et al., supra note
34, at 20.
86. See Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra
note 53, at 5; Bingol et al., supra note 55, at 95-96.
87. See Fink, supra note 24, at 5; Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed In-
fants and Children, supra note 53, at 5.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58; infra text accompanying
notes 107-110.
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caretakers must address in order to enable the children to
live a healthy, productive life. Unfortunately, as the discus-
sion below demonstrates, most drug-addicted parents cannot
provide adequate care for a child who does not have special
needs, and therefore, cannot hope to provide adequate care
for their drug-exposed child. As a result, many of the drug-
exposed children will suffer abuse and neglect from their ad-
dicted parent(s) after birth or will suffer the harm caused by
a cycle of foster care.
1. The Special Needs of Drug-Exposed Children
As stated above, a large number of drug-exposed children
will have special needs that flow from their in utero exposure
to cocaine. In the first two to three months after birth, drug-
exposed infants often have poor responses to their environ-
ment and are difficult to handle.8 9 For example, such chil-
dren are often "[g]iven to spasms, trembling and muscular ri-
gidity [and may] resist cuddling by arching their backs."9°
They also suffer from medical problems that, at least in the
early months, require extensive monitoring and care from the
parent.9' These medical complications may lead hospitals to
separate the children from their mothers at birth, causing a
lack of bonding between the mother and the child.92 Such
lack of bonding "may increase the risk of future neglect or
abuse."93
In addition, as one commentator has stated, "[t]he new-
born cocaine-exposed infants.., are almost never well-organ-
ized, fully functioning infants. Instead, they spend most of
their time in states which shut them off from external stimu-
lation, and their state changes tend to be abrupt and inappro-
priate for the level of stimulation encountered." 94 In the
study that led to this conclusion, the researchers found that
89. See Fink, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that irritability and difficulty in
handling often exist even up to four months of age).
90. Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed New-
born: A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 747 (1990)
(quoting Richard Lacayo, Nobody's Children, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 91-92).
91. See id. at 746.
92. Id. at 747.
93. Id.
94. Dan Griffith, The Effects of Perinatal Cocaine Exposure on Infant
Neurobehavior and Early Maternal-Infant Interactions, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL,
PREGNANCY AND PARENTING, supra note 34, at 105, 106.
306 [Vol. 34
the cocaine-exposed newborns exhibited four distinct types of
emotional states in the first month after birth.e5 Infants ex-
hibiting the first type remained in a deep sleep no matter
how much the researchers stimulated them (e.g., rocking,
talking, and physical manipulation)., 6 Infants exhibiting the
second type could not seem to go into a deep sleep; however,
they also did not wake up when the researchers stimulated
them.9 7 These infants whimpered, changed colors, breathed
irregularly, and thrashed about.98 Infants exhibiting the
third type responded to most stimulation by "mov[ing] ab-
ruptly from sleeping to agitated crying. As soon as the stimu-
lation [was] terminated, they pull[ed] down into their sleep
shelter again."ee Finally, infants exhibiting the fourth and
most common state "use[d] both sleeping and crying to shut
themselves off from excessive stimulation. These infants,
however, if managed carefully by the examiner, [we]re able to
reach very brief periods of alert responsiveness." 10 0
After one month the infants had improved, but many of
them "still ha[d] very low thresholds for overstimulation and
require[d] a great deal of careful handling and containment
from the examiner in order to reach and/or maintain respon-
sive states. Without examiner assistance, they often dis-
play[ed] abrupt, inappropriate state changes in response to
the demands of the exam."10 1 Even after one month there
were still some infants who could not handle even low levels
of stimulation. 10 2 These infants responded to such stimula-
tion by continually ciying until they fell into an exhausted
sleep. '0 3 The examiners were unable to do anything to soothe
these infants.10
4
Currently it is too soon to predict what neurological ef-
fect prenatal drug exposure will have as the children move
beyond the newborn stage and into preschool and school
95. Id. at 106
96. Id.
97. Id. at 107.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 107-08.
103. Id. at 108.
104. Id.
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age. 105 The information that is available, however, suggests
that many of these children will experience developmental
delays, and their special needs must be addressed if they are
to lead productive lives. 106
As stated earlier, studies have found below-average head
circumference to be endemic among infants whose mothers
used cocaine throughout the pregnancy.1 0 7 Because "head
size reflects intrauterine brain growth," a below-average
head size puts the child at increased risk for developmental
delays.108 Experts estimate that cocaine-exposed infants are
forty times more likely to experience motor difficulties; such
difficulties will impact the child's ability to explore and learn
about his or her environment.10 9
In addition, researchers have noted certain characteris-
tics in drug-exposed infants: "normal, although low-range, in-
telligence . . . serious difficulties in relating and reacting to
adults and their environments"; serious difficulties in "or-
ganizing creative play"; and similarities to "mildly autistic or
personality-disordered children."110 Again, one must keep in
mind that it is still too early to know whether the damage
will be permanent. The permanence of the damage will prob-
ably depend in large part upon the special services provided
to the child. 1
One study found that at up to one year of age, cocaine-
exposed infants are apathetic toward toys and to their envi-
ronment.1 12 After one year, however, they seemed calmer
105. See Rinkel, supra note 13, at 1; see also Fink, supra note 24, at 5.
106. It is important to note that contrary to some myths and stereotypes in
this area, there is no evidence that drug-exposed children are " 'asocial and in-
capable of bonding,' 'missing the core of what it takes to be human,' 'oblivious to
any affection,' [or] 'likely to be sociopaths.'" Rinkel, supra note 12, at 1 (citation
omitted). These children are likely to have special needs. However, like other
children with special needs, if properly cared for and provided with special serv-
ices, these children have the potential to live healthy, happy, and productive
lives. See Fink, supra note 24 at 6 (presenting information concerning pro-
grams designed to help mothers and infants to handle and perhaps correct de-
velopmental deficiencies).
107. See supra text accompanying note 65.
108. Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra note
53, at 5.
109. Fink, supra note 24, at 5.
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106.
112. See Fink, supra note 24, at 6.
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and their motor skills had improved. 113 A second study ob-
served cocaine-exposed infants up to two years of age. 11 4 The
study found that up to this age, the children still have serious
neuro-behavioral deficits, especially in terms of their ability
"to initiate creative play, play by themselves, organize their
responses and interact with other children."" 5
Finally, the Department of Pediatrics at the University
of California at Los Angeles compared eighteen cocaine-ex-
posed infants with eighteen drug-free infants. 1 6 All thirty-
six infants were eighteen months old, had the same prematu-
rity, the same lack of prenatal care, and the same socioeco-
nomic status. 7 The Department found that "the cocaine-ex-
posed group appeared markedly deficient. For instance, they
engaged in less representative play and were able to devise
only 10 combinations of particular toys, as compared to 38
among infants in [sic] control group. They demonstrated a
lack of self-organization, self-initiative and follow-
through.""'
2. Harm Caused to the Child by the Drug-Addicted
Parent's Inability to Provide Adequate Care
The special needs outlined above make caring properly
for a drug-exposed child difficult for any parent." 9 Such dif-
ficulty is multiplied if the parent involved is addicted to
drugs, because continued use often impairs the parent's abil-
ity to care for her child adequately.
120
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Some commentators have stated that "researchers have been un-
able to isolate the impact of cocaine from the impact of other variables of pov-
erty, such as poor nutrition, poor prenatal care, domestic violence, depression,
lack of social support, use of alcohol and cigarettes." Gertner, supra note 22, at
27 (footnote omitted). However, as the preceding California study indicates,
while variables of poverty, poor nutrition, etc. also have a negative effect upon
the unborn child, cocaine use in and of itself has a significant adverse impact
upon the unborn child. Id. For a discussion of how alcohol alone also has a
significant adverse impact, see generally Streissguth et al., supra note 13.
119. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 746 (suggesting that parents of
drug-affected children "may be unable to meet their children's special needs").
120. See id. at 746 n.5, 747 (explaining that parents' drug use may impair
their ability to care for their children).
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When an infant has difficulty in responding to her envi-
ronment in an organized fashion, as do most drug-exposed
children, 2 ' it is up to the parent to maintain the parent-child
relationship by changing her response to the infant to fit the
needs of the child. 122 If the parent cannot do this, then "the
infant is likely to be exposed repeatedly to experiences which
overwhelm him/her and impede rather than facilitate his/her
development." 23  Unfortunately, cocaine-abusing women
often cannot meet the infant's needs; therefore, the mother-
infant relationship is nonfunctional, and often detrimen-
tal. 24 As one commentator has stated, the combination of
"often insecure, sometimes inadequate mothers" 25 with "irri-
table, easily overloaded, unresponsive infants" often leads to
pathological mother-infant relationships. 26 These nonfunc-
tional relationships can manifest themselves in a number of
different ways: (1) situations in which the mothers "pay little
or no attention to either their infants' behavior or the feed-
back provided to them concerning how to better care for their
infants";127 (2) situations in which the mothers interpret
their infants' unresponsive behavior as a rejection of them,
which in turn may serve to confirm their beliefs that they are
bad mothers and increase their feelings of depression and
worthlessness; 128 and (3) situations in which the mothers
blame the infants for the infants' "rejection," which may lead
121. See supra text accompanying notes 89-118.
122. See Griffith, supra note 94, at 105.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Drug-abusing mothers' insecurity and inadequacy stems from a combi-
nation of the following: feelings of guilt concerning the potential harm that they
might have inflicted on their children; id. at 109; see also Amin N. Daghestani,
Psychosocial Characteristics of Pregnant Women Addicts in Treatment, in
DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING, supra note 34, at 8 (stating that
"the pregnant addict must deal with the additional sense of guilt and shame of
'hurting' her growing fetus as a result of drug use"); feelings of fear as to their
ability to meet the demands of their children, Griffith, supra note 94, at 109;
lower level of self-esteem and self-confidence, Daghestani, supra, at 8; and un-
realistic expectations concerning the abilities of their child. Griffith, supra note
94, at 109.
126. Griffith, supra note 94, at 109.
127. Id. at 110.
128. Id. See also Daghestani, supra note 125, at 8 (stating that women drug
abusers tend to have a higher level of depression and anxiety, and a higher
sense of powerlessness).
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the mothers to feel "ambivalent and sometimes hostile" to-
wards their children. 129
In addition to the difficulties of coping with a special-
needs child, many addicted parents cannot adequately pro-
vide the necessities of life for their children, because any re-
sources that an addict has must go to support her habit.130 A
full-blown cocaine habit may cost $200 to $400 a day. 131 This
drain on family funds means that children in that family will
suffer from inadequate nutrition, clothing, and shelter. 132
Further, many drug-affected newborns are left in hospitals as
"boarder babies" either because their parents have aban-
doned them or because social workers have determined that
the parents' abuse of drugs poses a danger to the child.
133
Whether due to an inability to cope with the child's
needs, the adverse side effects of a drug-induced lifestyle, or a
combination of both, drug-abusing parents are much more
likely to abandon, neglect, and/or abuse their children. One
study estimates that one-half of all child abuse and neglect
cases in New York City involve drug abuse.13 4 The estimate
rises to sixty-four percent if alcohol abuse is included. 35 Fur-
ther, in a 1986 study conducted by the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services, the researchers evaluated a
random sample of 385 children who were in foster care due to
129. Griffith, supra note 94, at 110.
130. See Keith et al., supra note 34, at 21.
131. Id.
132. See id. "The drain on family funds often initiates neglect and abuse of
existing family members, especially children, whose nutrition may be first to
suffer." Id.
133. See J.C. Barden, Hospitals House "Boarder Babies," THE OREGONIAN,
July 26, 1992, at D1. This newspaper article related the results of a study of
seventy-two public and private hospitals by the Child Welfare League of
America and the National Association of Public Hospitals. Id. The study
"found that the hospitals were caring for more than 7,000 boarder babies a year
... ." Id. It estimated that 87% of the boarder babies stay in the hospital one
month or less, 6% stay one to three months, and 7% stay more than three
months. Id. When the boarder babies leave the hospital, "58 percent go into
foster care while 21 percent go home to a parent. Most of the rest go to live with
relatives or adoptive parents . . . ." Id; see also Laurie Rubenstein, Current
Topics in Law and Policy, Prosecuting Maternal Substance Abusers: An Unjus-
tified and Ineffective Policy, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130, 136 (1991) ("Nearly
half of eighteen hospitals surveyed in one study reported a problem with
'boarder babies.' ").
134. See Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 32, at 1404.
135. Id. (citing M. Marriot, Child Abuse Cases Swamping New York City's
Family Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1987, at A17).
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parental abuse or neglect. 136 The study found that one-half
of the children came from parents or caretakers that the re-
searchers knew or suspected to be substance abusers. 137
Another study estimated that "half of the addicted
mothers not in drug treatment programs lose custody of their
children by one year of age."'13  A third study indicates that
"[alpproximately one-third to one-half of children born to
drug-using parents require foster home placement or are
reared by a non-parental guardian."139 As a result of such
problems, the children also suffer from the harms associated
with a cycle of foster care.
C. Statistics Regarding the Number of Children Affected
It is difficult to determine exactly how many children are
exposed in utero to illicit drugs and injured by such exposure.
However, the following sample statistics will help to demon-
strate the magnitude of the problem.
1. Number of Children Exposed In Utero
In 1991, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
estimated that 500,000 to 700,000 newborns annually are ex-
posed to illicit drugs in utero,140 which is fourteen to eighteen
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Fink, supra note 24, at 7.
139. Nolan, supra note 83, at 19. In a more specific study in Alameda
County, California, researchers found:
68% of the 215 families with children entering the foster care system
between June 24, 1987 and October 30, 1987 had parents described in
court reports as substance abusers .... Of the 822 intake referrals of
suspected child abuse or neglect reported to Child Protective Services
in San Mateo County from January 1 to March 11, 1988, 217 (26.3%)
were drug and/or alcohol related .... Of the 855 children who, as of
1988, were waiting to be placed or had been placed in a foster home,
57% involved parental alcohol/drug abuse as a factor in removal.
Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 748 n.11.
140. See Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra
note 53, at 5. In addition, the following statistics specific to certain areas are
available:
Boston: "A study of 1600 women at Boston City Hospital" demonstrated
that "17% had used cocaine [during pregnancy] and 27% had used marijuana"
during pregnancy. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 747 n.9 (citing Jane E.
Brody, Widespread Abuse of Drugs by Pregnant Women is Found, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1988, at Al).
California: A study released around the beginning of June 1991 "estimates
that about 2% of the 4,000 babies born each month in Orange County have
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percent of all newborns. 141 With regard to cocaine exposure,
Dr. Ira Chasnoff' 42 conducted a survey in 1988 that indicated
that each year "as many as 375,000 infants may be affected
by maternal cocaine use during pregnancy."143 Further, the
number of drug-exposed children has risen. In 1989, the U.S.
House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families
surveyed eighteen hospitals in the United States.14  This
committee learned that between 1985 and 1988, fifteen of the
eighteen hospitals "(14 public and one private) experienced a
three-to-four-fold increase in births of drug-exposed in-
fants."' 45 In addition, in 1989, the New York City Health De-
partment estimated that during the past ten years there had
been a 3000% increase of births by substance-abusing
women. 146
Studies also measure the number of pregnant women
who use drugs. "Based upon a survey of thirty-six hospitals
illicit drugs in their blood or about 80 [babies] a month." Dianne Klein, No Easy
Answers to Help Drug Babies, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1991, at El. A study at the
University of California at Davis Hospital, in Sacramento, California, reveals
that "25% of 800 [pregnant] women displayed signs of cocaine, amphetamines,
or heroin use." Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 747 n.9.
Delaware: At Christiana Hospital in Newark, Delaware, "24% of pregnant
women tested ... showed signs of drug abuse." Id. at 747 n.9.
Florida: At Jackson Memorial Hospital, in Miami, Florida, by the end of
1988, drug-abusing women gave birth to 150 children every month. Id.
Michigan: "[A] study at Hutzel Hospital in Detroit's inner city indicated
that 42.7 percent of its newborn babies [are] exposed to drugs" in utero. Paul A.
Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1990, at 23, 24.
New York: At Harlem Hospital in New York City, 15% of 3,000 newborns
were exposed to cocaine in utero. Id. In addition, Harlem Hospital reported
that in a typical week, "50 percent to 70 percent of newborn infants in [its]
neonatal intensive care unit test positive for cocaine." Fink, supra note 24, at 2
(citing A. Revkin, Crack in the Cradle, DISCOVER, Sept. 1989, at 63). It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the test used to identify drugs in the newborn only
measures the ingestion of cocaine shortly before delivery and, therefore, does
not include the possibly larger number of cases where a child is exposed to
drugs earlier in the pregnancy. Id.
141. See Chasnoff, Adoption of Drug-Exposed Infants and Children, supra
note 53, at 5.
142. Dr. Chasnoff is an Associate Professor of Northwestern University Med-
ical School and President of the National Association of Perinatal Addiction Re-
search and Education (NAPARE).
143. Logli, supra note 140, at 24 (emphasis added); see also Fink, supra note
24, at 2.
144. See Fink, supra note 24, at 3.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2.
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across the country, the National Association of Perinatal Ad-
diction Research and Education (NAPARE) estimated that
11% of women use drugs during pregnancy." 147
Unless something is done, the current trend indicates
that the number of cocaine-affected babies will continue to
rise. Cocaine abuse in general has risen dramatically in the
past ten years, and cocaine use by pregnant women has simi-
larly risen.148 Statistics demonstrate that large numbers of
women of child-bearing age are using cocaine.' 49 While in
general there has been a shift to cocaine by the drug-abusing
population, 50 the "shift towards crack has been especially
pronounced among women, who have joined the ranks of the
addicted in unprecedented numbers. "115i Given the nature of
drug use and addiction, it is likely that a significant number
of these drug-using young women will continue to use drugs
even if they become pregnant. 152 A rise in the number of
drug-affected babies will further strain a system that is al-
ready operating beyond its recommended capacity. 153
147. Id.
148. See MacGregor et al., supra note 61, at 686; see also Daghestani, supra
note 125, at 18 ("[C]ocaine use among pregnant women has become increasingly
common.").
149. See Gay M. Chisum, Nursing Interventions with the Antepartum Sub-
stance Abuser, J. PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING, Apr. 1990, at 26 ("A 1986
National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) survey revealed that 1 in 10 women of
child-bearing age had used cocaine in the previous year."); see also Chasnoff,
Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 32, at 1403.
Although patterns of abuse of alcohol, marijuana, heroin, and other
substances by women of childbearing age have changed very little over
the last 10 years, the incidence of cocaine use in this special population
has been rising rapidly, a reflection of cocaine's increasing popularity
among the general population of the United States.
Id; cf Daghestani, supra note 125, at 7 ("As more high school and college
women use drugs, the subpopulation of drug abusers of the child-bearing age is
correspondingly increasing. Although accurate statistics are lacking, the sub-
population represents now the largest group among women addicts."); Fink,
supra note 24, at 2 (nationally, "30 percent of women between 18 and 24 uti-
lized illicit drugs in the previous year [1986], a number reflecting the increased
prevalence of crack use among women." (citing Ira J. Chasnoff, Newborn In-
fants With Drug Withdrawal Symptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS REV. 273 (1988))).
150. See Fink, supra note 24, at 2; see also infra text accompanying notes
180-208.
151. Fink, supra note 24, at 2.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 180-200.
153. See Fink, supra note 24, at 2 (New York City's "neonatal intensive care
units are already running at 108 percent of capacity, with some units, such as
Harlem Hospital, running as high as at 200 percent of capacity.")
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2. Degree of Harm to Exposed Children
Little information exists concerning how many children
will be adversely affected by in utero exposure to damaging
substances, or how seriously they will be affected. The infor-
mation that is available estimates that thirty to forty percent
of children exposed to both legal and illegal substances in
utero will be adversely affected by such exposure.1 5 4 This
rate may rise in later years, because some of the adverse ef-
fects, such as central nervous system damage, may not mani-
fest themselves until preschool or school age. 155 One com-
mentator believes that the rate with regard to cocaine
exposure is already much higher than current studies
show. 156 This commentator suggests that very few infants
who are exposed to cocaine in utero will fully escape
damage.' 57
II. THE ExISTING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
ARE INEFFECTIVE
The problem of substance-abusing pregnant women is
complex. No one solution, proposal, or bill is likely to resolve
the problem. However, as this article was being written,
large numbers of children were being harmed due to exposure
in utero to dangerously damaging substances.158 Thus, in
spite of the complexity of the problem, there is a pressing
need for the states to put in place some type of legislation
that will protect as many children as possible and that will do
so as soon as possible. While many commentators have writ-
ten about the problem of prenatal drug exposure and pro-
posed a variety of solutions, each proposed solution is incom-
plete in that, for one reason or another, it will not protect as
many children as possible as soon as possible. Such protec-
tion is the focus of this article and is the guiding force for the
proposal advocated in Section III. First, however, the article
generally outlines the existing proposed solutions and the
reasons each solution is incomplete.
154. See Rinkel, supra note 12, at 1 (citations omitted).
155. See Fink, supra note 24, at 2.
156. See id. at 3.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12, 140-153.
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A. More Drug Treatment Centers
Some commentators have asserted that the solution to
the problem of substance-abusing pregnant women is for the
state to provide additional comprehensive drug treatment
centers for pregnant women; this plan is also known as the
comprehensive drug treatment proposal. 5 9 More specifi-
cally, one commentator has suggested that state legislatures
enact statutes designed to do the following: (1) "provide early
treatment intervention and child care services for parents
while they undergo alcohol or drug treatment"; (2) "mandate
that drug treatment programs not discriminate against preg-
nant women"; and (3) "provide increased funding of prenatal
services for poor women."160 The commentator asserts that
159. See Fink, supra note 24 at 6-7 (Substantial initiatives are needed 'to
expand and replicate the small number of model programs in existence nation-
ally to provide comprehensive, multidisciplinary treatment services to sub-
stance abusing pregnant women, mothers and their children." Such programs
would help mitigate "some of the symptoms afflicting children who have al-
ready been exposed."); see also Kary Moss, Recent Development, Substance
Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 297 (1990) ('Forcing al-
cohol and drug treatment programs to admit pregnant women ... is a more
effective method of decreasing exposure to drugs in utero ... than imposing
criminal sanctions or depriving mothers of their custody rights."); Michelle
Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of
Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 546 (1992) (suggesting
that the way to address the problem of pregnant substance abusers is to en-
courage addicted women to obtain treatment, but recognizing that "treatment
that truly is designed to meet the needs of this population is only now being
developed"); Lisa Janovy Keyes, Comment, Rethinking the Aim of the "War on
Drugs": States' Roles in Preventing Substance Abuse by Pregnant Women, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 197, 217 ("States can attack perinatal substance abuse by provid-
ing drug treatment, prenatal care and other supportive services to those lacking
resources of their own."); Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem of
Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Ap-
proaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1401 (1990) ("(S]tates should concentrate on
making education, prenatal care, and drug treatment facilities readily available
to addicted women."); John E.B. Myers, A Limited Role for the Legal System in
Responding to Maternal Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 5 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 747, 759 (1991) (advocating "vastly increased funding
for drug treatment programs and prenatal care, coupled with expanded educa-
tion programs to inform women about the dangers of drug use during
pregnancy").
160. Moss, supra note 159, at 297-98; see also Lee A. Schott, Recent Develop-
ment, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case and Fetal Harm: Prosecution or Preven-
tion?, 11 Hnv. WOMEN'S L.J. 227, 244 (1988) ("[T]he state wishing to protect
potential life should increase its commitment of resources to prenatal care.");
Stephen R. Kandall and Wendy Chavkin, Illicit Drugs in America: History, Im-
pact on Women and Infants, and Treatment Strategies for Women, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 615, 643 (1992) (advocating "an approach that combines treatment for drug
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"[e]ach of these measures would go a long way toward im-
proving the chances that pregnant addicts would conquer
their addictions and obtain the health care they need, while
taking the child's needs into account as well."161 She further
indicates that Rhode Island and Washington have enacted
legislation that she believes to be in line with her proposal."6 2
Rhode Island "has amended its Maternal and Child Health
Services law to provide outpatient alcohol and drug treat-
ment services, as well as childbirth and parenting prepara-
tion programs for pregnant women who meet certain finan-
cial requirements," and Washington "has increased its
funding of alcohol and drug treatment programs. '"13
In some ways this comprehensive drug treatment propo-
sal is facially appealing, addressing an important fact. In the
long term, the states need to provide better prenatal services
for poor women, more drug treatment centers in general, and
more treatment centers for pregnant women specifically. It is
well documented that those women who become pregnant
and want to rid themselves of their addiction often find that
drug treatment for pregnant women is a scarce commodity.
164
There are several reasons for this limited availability. In
many cases, the existing drug treatment programs do not ad-
mit pregnant women, 1 5 often "because they fear liability or
lack obstetrical services."' 6  If you are poor and pregnant,
the problem is exacerbated. A number of the programs do not
provide services for pregnant women on Medicaid, 167 and the
addiction, medical and therapeutic services for mother and child, education and
job training, assistance with concrete needs such as day care and housing, and
long term after-care focused on relapse prevention and management").
161. Moss, supra note 159, at 298.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without
Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 605 (1992) ("[Tjhe vast ma-
jority of pregnant women seeking assistance to overcome drug dependency can-
not obtain the help they need."); Oberman, supra note 157, at 518 (reporting
that access to treatment for pregnant women addicted to drugs is limited).
165. See Johnsen, supra note 164, at 576; Fink, supra note 24, at 7.
166. Moss, supra note 159, at 287; see also Oberman, supra note 159, at 518
(explaining that physicians and treatment centers fear the greater legal liabil-
ity that comes with high-risk pregnancies as well as the possibility of a lawsuit
claiming that the withdrawal process harmed the child).
167. See Fink, supra note 24, at 7; see also infra note 169.
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cost of most programs is prohibitively high. 168  In addition,
many of the drug treatment programs that do admit preg-
nant women are inadequate in that they do not provide pre-
natal care169 or family-centered services. 1 70 The few family-
centered services that do exist are inundated with inquiries
from pregnant addicts who want help. 1 71
The programs that currently exist play an extremely im-
portant role in reducing substance abuse, 172 and the need for
more such programs cannot be over-stressed if the states
hope to combat the problem of pregnant substance abusers
causing harm to their children in utero. However, striving for
the comprehensive drug treatment proposal as the only solu-
tion to in utero drug exposure is inadequate because, for sev-
eral reasons, the proposal will have a very limited impact.
168. See Oberman, supra note 159, at 517 (stating that inpatient treatment
is recommended for pregnant women, but that in an informal survey of inpa-
tient programs in the Chicago area, it was found that the minimum cost was
$12,000 per month and "none of them accepted Medicaid or offered any sub-
stantial financial assistance").
169. See Fink, supra note 24, at 7 ("Two-thirds of the hospitals surveyed by
the House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families reported that
they had no drug treatment programs" to which they could refer pregnant pa-
tients, and none of the hospitals indicated the "availability of special programs
geared to providing comprehensive drug treatment and prenatal care.... ."). In
a survey by Dr. Wendy Chavkin from the Columbia University School of Public
Health, of "78 drug treatment programs in New York City (95 percent of the
City's programs) ... 54 percent ... categorically exclude pregnant women, 67
percent exclude pregnant women on Medicaid and 87 percent had no services
for crack-addicted pregnant women.... [leaving only] (44 percent) [that] simul-
taneously provided pre-natal care." Id.
170. Id. See also Oberman, supra note 159, at 519 (stating that most treat-
ment programs "are struggling for funding" and cannot provide the broad range
of services needed by pregnant addicts).
171. See Fink, supra note 24, at 7; Johnsen, supra note 164, at 576.
172. See Fink, supra note 24, at 7 ("[Sleveral programs have reported
marked success in treating infants and equipping their mothers to care for
them .... "); Wilkins, supra note 159, at 1438-40 (Northwestern Memorial Hos-
pital in Chicago, Illinois has a comprehensive treatment program where 70% of
the mothers in the program deliver drug-free babies and an estimated 25% to
50% of the women stop taking drugs permanently); Rubenstein, supra note 133,
at 150 (Mandella House, a residential treatment program in Oakland, Califor-
nia, "teaches women how to manage their time, how to stay on a schedule, and
how to care for their children." This program "has a 75% to 80% success rate.").
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1. The Comprehensive Drug Treatment Proposal Will
Reach Only a Limited Number of Women
First, even if the comprehensive drug treatment proposal
works exactly as envisioned, 173 a large number of substance-
abusing women will not be reached, and many of the ones not
reached will invariably continue to give birth to drug-affected
children. 174 By providing availability and access to needed
services, the comprehensive drug treatment proposal will try
to provide help for those who recognize that they have a drug
problem and are trying to eliminate it. It will therefore reach
only those women who voluntarily seek drug or alcohol treat-
ment or who voluntarily seek prenatal services. It will not
reach women who do not know that they are pregnant; wo-
men (pregnant or not) who do not recognize that they have a
problem; or women (pregnant or not) who recognize their
need for help, but who refuse to seek assistance for their sub-
stance-abuse problem.
Due to the nature of drug addiction, many drug-addicted
women do not know they are pregnant until well into the
pregnancy. 175 In many instances, drug addiction interferes
with a woman's menses, and therefore an addicted woman
will often attribute missed menses to drugs rather than to
pregnancy. 7 6 Thus, even if pregnancy motivates a drug-ad-
dicted woman to seek drug treatment, she often will not do so
until the third trimester. 177 Since a significant amount of the
173. For an argument concerning the problems surrounding drug and alco-
hol treatment, see infra text accompanying notes 200-203.
174. See Oberman, supra note 159, at 512 (stating that due to a number of
factors, addicted women "run a high risk of pregnancy").
175. See, e.g., Daghestani, supra note 125, at 8 ("[F]emale addicts tend not to
suspect their pregnancy early, sometimes not even until the pregnancy is in its
second trimester."); Keith et al., supra note 34, at 24 ("[All too often women are
unaware that they are pregnant during the first few weeks of embryonic life.");
Judy Howard, Chronic Drug Users as Parents, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 649 (1992)
("[M]any substance abusing women may not realize they have conceived until
well into their pregnancy ....").
176. Daghestani, supra note 125, at 8; see also Keith et al., supra note 34, at
24 ("Depending to some extent on the agent of abuse, menstrual abnormalities
are relatively common in substance-abusing women."); Howard, supra note 175,
at 648 ("[Mlany chemically dependent women experience interferences with
menstruation and may miss periods.").
177. See Daghestani, supra note 125, at 8 (stating that "addicted pregnant
women tend to seek help during their third trimester rather than during the
first or second one").
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in utero harm occurs in the first trimester,' 7 and since the
comprehensive drug treatment proposal is designed to help
only pregnant women, the proposal can only hope to forestall
additional harm to an existing unborn child.179
Further, an addict often refuses to acknowledge that she
has a drug problem. With regard to women addicts, the evi-
dence indicates that while they are more likely than men to
admit that they have a problem, "they are less likely to see
their addiction as a major problem, since they view their hab-
its as 'therapeutic' or coping devices." 8 0 If a woman does not
believe that she has a significant problem, she will not seek
treatment, regardless of how many suitable drug treatment
programs are available.
Finally, although commentators disagree about the de-
gree of motivation that drug-addicted parents have to care for
their children,' 8 ' the fact remains that a large number of par-
ents and potential parents exist who cannot or will not seek
help for their drug abuse. While some commentators contend
that "Im]any chemically dependent women become highly
motivated during pregnancy to make positive lifestyle
changes [and that pregnant substance abusers] care deeply
for their children and are anxious to get help in dealing with
their addiction that often prevents them from being loving,
responsible parents,"8 2 the fact remains that a desire to
change does not necessarily lead to a change. In addition, the
commentators ignore the fact that there are large numbers of
178. See supra text accompanying note 51.
179. Of course, if the drug treatment program works, it might prevent harm
to later children of this woman. It will, however, do so only to the extent that
the woman is prevented from conceiving while she is still undergoing drug
treatment.
180. Oberman, supra note 159, at 512.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 182-193.
182. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 766 (quoting Diane F. Reed, Compre-
hensive Family-Centered Plan for Chemically Dependent Women and Their
Children 4, 8 (1988) (unpublished manuscript)); see also Myers, supra note 160,
at 759 (stating that "virtually all women want to give birth to healthy babies");
cf. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 765 (stating that "drug-dependent parents
usually have a strong desire to care for their child" (quoting Gunilla Larsson,
Amphetamine Addiction and Pregnancy: Analysis of Basic Information Con-
cerning Measures Taken by Social Welfare Agencies, 4 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
89, 97 (1980))).
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pregnant women who lack the desire to voluntarily overcome
their addiction.1
8 3
As one commentator has stated:
Several discouraging things have become painfully evi-
dent in considering the child and the addicted parent: (1)
Addicts do not alter their life style to accommodate a new
child; (2) they fail to make responsible decisions concern-
ing their children; and (3) they are incapable of acting in
the best interests of their child or of meeting a child's
needs at the denial of their own. 184
A 1986 study conducted by the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services demonstrated that a substan-
tial number of substance-abusing parents might reject any
services offered that might offer more of a chance to their
children.18 5 This study evaluated 385 children who were in
foster care because of abuse or neglect.18 6 One-half of the
children "came from parents or caretakers who were known
or suspected substance abusers." 87 Fifty-five percent of the
parents rejected offered social services, and sixty-eight per-
cent "rejected substance abuse services."188
This failure to voluntarily seek drug treatment does not
mean that these women are ill-intentioned and evil, uncaring
about the welfare of their children-they are not. Rather, it
183. See Beyond the Stereotype: Women, Addiction, and Perinatal Substance
Abuse: Hearing Before the [House] Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Fami-
lies, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 114-15 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Dr.
Jing Ja Yoon, Chief of Neonatology at the Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center,
Bronx, New York).
Many cocaine-using mothers seem to have little concern about their
babies. Heroin mothers 10 to 20 years ago always wanted to take their
babies home .... Even though they go home and get heroin, they come
back the next day, they want [sic] to know how the baby is and they
wanted to take their babies home. Women on crack don't. They sign
themselves out on the same day of delivery or [sic] next day and they
disappear. Babies are often left in the hospital and we cannot even
locate their mothers in many occasions. They may come back next year
or within six months or seven months to deliver another premature
baby, and they disappear within one day again.
Id.
184. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 765, (quoting Judianne Densen-Gerber
& Charles C. Rohrs, Drug-Addicted Parents and Child Abuse, 2 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROBS. 683, 687-88 (1973)).
185. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 32, at 1404.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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is because those parents eager to provide a good home for
their child are often faced with insurmountable barriers.
While one of the barriers is created by the lack of necessary
services, 189 the greatest barrier may be that drug addiction
removes a person's desire for change. The nature of drug ad-
diction is such that many drug-addicted women cannot, or
will not, help themselves. 190 This is true even though they
generally care about their children and want to have healthy
babies. 9 "Addiction typically involves loss of control over
use of the drug and continued involvement with the drug even
when there are serious consequences." 92 Thus, the addict is
controlled by the need for the drug or alcohol. 193
For example, Cindy Boyd is the mother of a child, Kayla,
who was born addicted to drugs.
"I was taking methamphetamine," she says. "I was doing
like mega amounts, to the point that I wanted an abor-
tion, but I was too far along. Then when I got out of jail, I
got high three times. It's real sick. You're still an addict.
It's there. I was having a hard time....
"One of the real strange, sick thoughts I would have
when I was sticking the needle in me when I was preg-
nant was that I was sticking a needle in an infant's arm,"
Cindy says. "It's a real hard thing to explain to someone
who is not addicted. It's a real strange, hard thing. Be-
cause I love children so much."' 94
Cindy has three other children by her ex-husband.195 She
says that "she understood what she was doing to her unborn
child, and herself." 96 This did not, however, "translate into
trying to turn her life around." 97 She says that she did not
189. See supra text accompanying notes 164-171.
190. See Keith et al., supra note 34, at 19 (arguing that an addict's attempt
"to control, reduce or eliminate addiction frequently [is] undertaken only in re-
sponse to court orders or in the hope that such activity will be looked upon with
favor by law enforcement agencies").
191. See Moss, supra note 159, at 287; Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 765-
766.
192. Moss, supra note 159, at 287.
193. See Hearing, supra note 183, at 115 (statement of Dr. Jing Ja Yoon)
(explaining that mothers on crack only care about getting crack; "that's their
priority").
194. See Klein, supra note 140, at El.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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know how. 198 In addition, "she did not want any help. A few
people suggested that it might be a good idea. But Cindy just
wanted drugs."'99
2. Many Women Will Not Complete a Drug Treatment
Program
In addition to reaching only a limited number of women,
the comprehensive drug treatment proposal fails to recognize
that even if a woman can get into a drug treatment program,
there is no guarantee that, in the absence of coercive meas-
ures, she will complete the program. One study has demon-
strated that only ten to fifteen percent of those who enroll in
"traditional therapeutic drug communities complete the pro-
grams."200 In fact, one-half of those who drop out do so "in
the first ninety days. Of those who complete the programs
... 77 percent display significant reductions in drug abuse
and criminal behavior and concomitant rises in employment
rates .... ,,201 Yet, for a significant minority (twenty-three
percent of those who complete the programs), the programs
are ineffective.2 °2 Thus, for those who enroll (ignoring for
now the fact that there are large numbers of addicts who do
not enroll and will never voluntarily enroll), only 7.7% to
11.55% will significantly decrease their drug use.20 3
B. Criminal Prosecution and Incarceration
The second proposed solution to the problem of pregnant
substance-abusers is criminal prosecution and incarceration.
Included in this category are the attempts (generally unsuc-
cessful) by a number of state prosecutors to use existing crim-
inal statutes to prosecute substance-abusing women who
harm their children in utero.2 °4 Also included in this cate-
gory are instances in which some judges have jailed sub-
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Fink, supra note 24, at 8 n.8 (citing J. PLAUT & T. KELLEY, N.Y. INTER-
FACE DEV. PROJECT, INC., CHILDWATCH: CHILDREN AND DRUGS (1989)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 7.
204. See LYNN M. PALTROW, AM. CV. LIBERTIES UNION FOUND., CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN: NATIONAL UPDATE AND OVERVIEW
(1992). Paltrow gives a comprehensive listing of criminal prosecutions in this
area. Id. This overview reports at least 167 such prosecutions. Id. at i & n.1.
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stance-abusing pregnant women on the theory that such jail-
ing will protect the unborn child.2 °5 Such prosecutions and
incarcerations fail to address effectively the problem of pre-
natal drug exposure for several reasons. First, the statutes
that the prosecutors use were not designed to address sub-
stance abuse by pregnant women. Second, incarceration or
punishment of pregnant substance abusers will not deter
such conduct. Third, incarceration will harm, rather than
protect, the unborn child. Finally, society needs to find ways
to reduce, rather than increase, the prison population.
1. The Prosecutions
Two highly publicized cases exemplify the use of criminal
prosecutions to alleviate prenatal drug exposure. In the case
of People v. Green ,206 Melanie Green, age twenty-four, gave
birth to a child who died two days after it was born.2" 7 The
baby and the mother "tested positive for the presence of co-
caine in their systems."20  The prosecutor charged Green
with "Involuntary Manslaughter and Delivery of a Controlled
Substance."20 9 The grand jury, however, refused to return an
indictment. 210 In Johnson v. State,21 1 a prosecutor in Florida
creatively used a drug statute to prosecute Jennifer Johnson,
who had given birth to a cocaine-affected baby.21 2 Johnson
was charged with, and found guilty of, "deliver[ing] a con-
205. See Ellen M. Barry, Pregnant, Addicted and Sentenced: Debunking the
Myths of Medical Treatment in Prison, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1991, at 22, 23
[hereinafter Barry, Pregnant, Addicted and Sentenced] ("[O]ver the last few
years there has been an unmistakable and unfortunate trend toward incarcer-
ating pregnant women who appear to be drug or alcohol-dependent at the time
of sentencing."); see also, e.g., Catherine A. Kyres, Note, A "Cracked" Image of
My Mother/Myself? The Need for a Legislative Directive Proscribing Maternal
Drug Abuse, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1325, 1335 (1991). Kyres reports that a
Washington, D.C. Superior Court judge sentenced a pregnant woman to 180
days in jail after she was convicted of second-degree theft for issuing bad
checks. Id. The time in jail was "subject to a motion to reduce her confinement
after her baby's birth." Id. The judge contended that "the baby was in need of
protection due to the mother's alleged drug use." Id.
206. No. 88-CM-8256 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed May 8, 1989).
207. See Logli, supra note 140, at 24.
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1992).
212. Id.
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trolled substance to a child."213 Since the statute did not en-
compass unborn children, "delivery, for purposes of the stat-
ute, occurred through the umbilical cord" in the short space of
time "after the birth of the child and before the cord was sev-
ered."214 The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision
and remanded with directions to reverse.
215
2. Flaws in Such Prosecutions
A number of problems plague prosecutors' efforts in this
area. The first problem relates to the criminal prosecutions
themselves. The statutes that prosecutors are currently
utilizing include the following: child endangerment, distribu-
tion of drugs to minors,21 6 criminal abuse and neglect, invol-
untary manslaughter, and drug use.21 7 These statutes, how-
ever, were generally not designed to encompass substance
abuse by pregnant women;218 thus, such prosecutions are
generally unsuccessful. 219 Further, use of such statutes vio-
lates the mandate of strict construction, which requires "that
criminal statutes generally be read against the state and in
favor of the defendant."220 The prosecutors' failure to strictly
construe the statutes discussed above means that potential
offenders will not receive fair warning that their conduct con-
stitutes a punishable crime.221 Of course, if legislatures pass
213. See Logli, supra note 140, at 24-25.
214. Id.
215. Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
216. See 13 OFFICE OF ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE PROGRAMS, OR. ALCOHOL &
DRUG REV. 23 (1993).
217. See PALTROW, supra note 205, at ii.
218. See Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is
This the Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 547 ("[T]he majority of these stat-
utes do not expressly include the fetus within their protection .... Even if the
statute expressly protects 'those conceived, but not yet born,' it must be shown
that the legislature intended that the statute apply to the mother's conduct."
(footnote and citations omitted)). Id.
219. See id. 547-52 for a detailed discussion of the various prosecutions and
their failures.
220. James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal
Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (1991)
(citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)); see also Wilkins, supra
note 159, at 1413 ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has held many times
that criminal statutes must be strictly and narrowly interpreted, with any am-
biguity resolved in favor of lenity.").
221. See Denison, supra note 220, at 1118 (stating that the rationale for
strict construction "lies ... in avoiding interference with legislatures' intended
meanings and in providing fair warning to potential offenders").
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statutes designed to deal specifically with substance-abusing
pregnant women, this problem becomes moot. There are,
however, additional problems relating to incarceration that
make the prosecutors' efforts unpalatable.
Incarceration for a crime is designed to serve at least two
purposes-retribution/punishment and deterrence.222 How-
ever, various policy reasons exist to mandate against punish-
ment of women for their conduct in this area. Currently, and
as previously discussed, a number of these women do not
have options in terms of comprehensive drug treatment.223
Therefore, the culpability that would warrant retribution is
lacking in many cases.224 In addition, drug laws currently
exist that are specifically designed to punish persons for drug
use. Providing additional punishment for such drug use is
unnecessary and duplicative.
With regard to deterrence, there are two types of deter-
rence that incarceration might promote. One type can be la-
beled "specific deterrence" and consists of deterring the wo-
man from using drugs while she is pregnant by cutting her off
from her supply.225 Another type, "general deterrence," con-
sists of deterring the woman and others from using drugs
while pregnant by giving them the message that if they en-
gage in this type of activity, they may be caught and
punished.226
Incarceration will not promote general deterrence, be-
cause, given the nature of drug addiction, the possibility of a
jail term is unlikely to deter a woman from abusing sub-
stances while she is pregnant. 227 The key to general deter-
222. See infra text accompanying note 288.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 164-171.
224. See Glink, supra note 218, at 573 (arguing that retribution is not justi-
fied with regard to substance-abusing pregnant women because avenues of self-
help are closed).
If, however, a woman has options (or society reaches the stage where wo-
men have options) and she nevertheless chooses to abuse the child in utero,
punishment may be in order.
225. See Denison, supra note 220, at 1120 (arguing that specific deterrence is
preventing an individual from committing further offenses and that general de-
terrence is signaling to others that similar offenses will not be tolerated).
226. Id.
227. See Wilkins, supra note 159, at 1434; see also Keyes, supra note 159, at
207 ("[C]riminal sanctions are not general deterrents to perinatal substance
abuse."); Myers, supra note 159, at 757 ("There is very little, if any, evidence
that the threat of criminal punishment deters pregnant women as a group from
using drugs."); Barry, supra note 205, at 24 ("Research and practical experience
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rence is rational cost-benefit analysis. 228 A person must be
able to weigh the benefit of drug use against the cost of such
drug use (incarceration) and find that the benefit is out-
weighed by the cost. An addict, however, is controlled by her
need for the drug and does not rationally weigh costs and
benefits. 229 Even if the addict was able to weigh the costs
and benefits rationally, the need for the drug is so strong that
the benefit of drug use would always outweigh the cost.
230
This inability to generally deter an addict is exemplified by
the fact that laws already exist prohibiting the sale, posses-
sion, and use of drugs. Since these laws do not deter preg-
nant addicts from using drugs, it is highly unlikely that addi-
tional laws leading to incarceration will make a difference.
231
Thus, to the extent that a woman is incarcerated under the
theory that it will deter others from drug use while pregnant,
such incarceration is ineffective.
Some judges, however, seek to specifically deter preg-
nant, addicted women by incarcerating them. The theory is
that such incarceration will protect the unborn child.232 The
evidence, however, overwhelmingly demonstrates that incar-
ceration will not protect the unborn child, and in some cases,
it will further harm the child.2 3 For various reasons, de-
scribed below, jail or prison is generally an unhealthy envi-
ronment, and harm to the mother in turn causes harm to the
child in utero. Due to overcrowding, women are often forced
to sleep on thin mats on the floor of their cells.234 The women
generally receive inadequate prenatal care and inadequate
general medical care.235 They also cannot obtain adequate
nutrition or exercise.236 Further, the belief that the unborn
child will be protected because its mother cannot obtain
have shown that the threat of incarceration has no significant deterrent effect
on the behavior of pregnant, substance-dependent women.").
228. See Wilkins, supra note 159, at 1434.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra note 205.
233. See Denison, supra note 220 (arguing that prosecution does not protect
the child, and prison conditions themselves may cause injury to developing
fetuses).
234. See Ellen M. Barry, Recent Development, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 189 (1989).
235. See id. at 190.
236. See id.
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drugs is misplaced. Drugs are often available to a woman
while she is incarcerated.237 In fact, in some places, illicit
drugs are more readily available in the correctional facilities
than on the streets. 238 To the extent that the woman cannot
obtain drugs and is required to withdraw from such usage,
the correctional facility is not a suitable place for this with-
drawal. Effective drug and alcohol detoxification is rarely
available; thus, the women are generally forced to withdraw
"cold turkey."239 Doctors never recommend that a pregnant
woman withdraw "cold turkey" because it can cause the wo-
man to miscarry or it can damage the unborn child. 24 °
If a woman is jailed after giving birth to a drug-affected
child, such incarceration will prevent her from becoming
pregnant while she is incarcerated, but it is highly likely that
she will continue to use drugs if she receives no drug treat-
ment while she is in jail. Thus, if she becomes pregnant
again, the drug use will harm another child.241 In addition,
such incarceration will injure the child to whom she has
given birth. Incarceration deprives the child of its opportu-
nity to bond with its mother.242 Further, it places the child in
an already overburdened foster care system with its conse-
quent harms.243
Finally, given the current state of our criminal justice
system, there is a need for alternatives to incarceration in ap-
propriate cases. We have "increased prison and jail popula-
tions,"244 and there are "inadequate resources for American
prisons and jails. Nationally, the prison system is virtually
exploding with an inmate population in excess of 600,000.
Research has demonstrated deleterious conditions to be a
major source of inmate dissatisfaction and even prison ri-
237. See Barry, Pregnant, Addicted and Sentenced, supra note 205, at 26;
Wilkins, supra note 159, at 1434.
238. See Barry, Pregnant, Addicted, and Sentenced, supra note 205, at 26.
239. See id. at 23-24.
240. See id.
241. See Denison, supra note 220, at 1130.
242. See Wilkins, supra note 159, at 1435; see also Joyce Lind Terres, Prena-
tal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the Government Intervene?, 18 Am. J. CRIM.
L. 61 (1990) ("Incarceration after the child is born isolates the mother from the
newborn in the most essential stages of its development and does not enable the
mother to become a more responsible parent.").
243. See infra text accompanying notes 259-261.
244. See STEVEN D. DILLINGHAM ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN PRACTICE
2 (2d ed. 1990).
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ots." 245  We have the problem of imprisoning an "ever-in-
creasing number[ ] of offenders in prisons designed for far
fewer occupants."246 There are also enormous monetary
costs. "Recent research has estimated the operational cost of
housing an inmate in the United States to be approximately
$16,000 per year, in addition to the capital expenditures for
each bed space that range between $50,000 and $100,000.
"1247
While in many situations "incarceration is both cost-effective
and deserved,"248 in many situations it is not. "[N]ot all de-
fendants or offenders pose equal dangers to the community.
Indeed, a percentage are found to be nonviolent and possible
candidates for alternative programs."249
C. Taking the Child Away and Placing the Child in Foster
Care
As the above discussion illustrates, criminal prosecution
coupled with incarceration is not a viable solution to the prob-
lem of prenatal drug exposure. Recognizing this, some juris-
dictions have proposed or enacted legislation expanding the
definition of a neglected child to include children who were
exposed to drugs in utero.25 ° In addition, some courts have
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citations omitted).
250. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West 1993) (Harm to a
child can occur when a parent inflicts injury upon the child. Injury includes
"[p]hysical dependency of a newborn infant upon any drug controlled in Sched-
ule I" or Schedule II.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3(1)(c) (Smith-Hurd
1990):
Those who are neglected include: ... any newborn infant whose blood
or urine contains any amount of a controlled substance as defined in
... the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, . . . or a metabolite of a
controlled substance, with the exception of controlled substances or
metabolites of such substances, the presence of which in the newborn
infant is the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or
the newborn infant.
Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1(1)(A), (B) (Burns Supp. 1993) ("A child is a
child in need of services if: (1) The child is born with: (A) Fetal alcohol syn-
drome; or (B) An addiction to a controlled substance or a legend drug . . .");
MAss. GEN. LAws AN-N. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1993) (stating that physi-
cians need to report to the department of public welfare any child "who is deter-
mined to be physically dependent upon an addictive drug at birth"); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993):
Neglect includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance, . . . used
by the mother for a nonmedical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal
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found that a woman's use of alcohol or drugs during preg-
nancy constitutes child neglect or child abuse. 251 Through
such legislation and case law, the court can "assert jurisdic-
tion over a newborn infant born drug-affected," without the
state being required "to show either the addiction of the child
or harmful effects on the child."252 Once the court has juris-
diction over the child, it can "remove the child from [its] drug-
abusing mother."253 One commentator has suggested that, in
addition to removing the child from the home, such legisla-
tion allows the prosecutors to "work with the mother in a
rather coercive atmosphere to encourage her to enter into
symptoms in the child at birth, results of a toxicology test performed on
the mother at delivery or the child at birth, or medical effects or devel-
opmental delays during the child's first year of life that medically indi-
cate prenatal exposure to a controlled substance.
Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.330(1)(b) (1991) ("A child is in need of protection if:
... (b) He is suffering from congenital drug addiction or the fetal alcohol syn-
drome, because of the faults or habits of a person responsible for his welfare
.... "); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(4) (West 1987):
"Deprived child" means a child.., who is a child in need of special care
and treatment because of his physical or mental condition including a
child born in a condition of dependence on a controlled dangerous sub-
stance, and his parents, legal guardian, or other custodian is unable or
willfully fails to provide said special care and treatment ....
Id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-509(1) (1989) ("The division shall make a thor-
ough investigation upon receiving either an oral or written report of alleged
abuse, neglect, fetal alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug dependency, when there is
reasonable cause to suspect a situation of abuse, neglect, fetal alcohol syn-
drome, or fetal drug dependency.").
251. See, e.g., In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (1990) (ar-
guing that maternal drug abuse that harms fetus warrants "judicial interven-
tion for the protection of the child"); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 1986) (holding that a viable fetus was a "child" and therefore harm to a
viable fetus may constitute child abuse; "the natural mother['s use of] heroin so
close to the birth of [the] child did create a substantial risk to the health of [the]
child"); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 335 (1985) (holding "that an unborn child
is a 'person"' under the child abuse statute); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that "prenatal treatment [of a child] can be con-
sidered probative of a child's neglect," and thus when a newborn had narcotics
withdrawal symptoms, the mother's conduct constituted neglect); In re Male R.,
422 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (1979) (holding that when a newborn suffered drug with-
drawal symptoms, the mother's drug use established a prima facie case of child
neglect); In re Vanesa F, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1974) ("A new-
born baby having withdrawal symptoms is prima facie a neglected baby under
the Family Court Act, Article 10 .. .
252. Logli, supra note 140, at 27.
253. Id.
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drug rehabilitation and, upon the successful completion of
the program, be reunited with her child."254
The above-outlined approach is incomplete primarily be-
cause it fails to protect children from in utero drug exposure.
The state intervenes only after the child has been born drug-
affected. In addition, while it is hoped that the mother will
obtain treatment, the abuse and neglect laws do not mandate
such treatment. In fact, as previously discussed, the mother
is unlikely to receive the treatment that she needs.255 Thus,
the state does nothing to prevent the woman from having an-
other child while she is still addicted.256
In spite of the deficiencies in the abuse and neglect pro-
posal, it would be viable as a less coercive proposal if, after
removal from their mothers, the children were provided with
a loving and nurturing environment where they would re-
ceive the care that they need to become healthy and produc-
tive individuals. Alternatively, the abuse and neglect propo-
sal would be viable if the addicted mother was provided with
and required to avail herself of the drug treatment and
parenting training that she needs to become a fit parent.
257
However, this is not the case. The services that the mother
needs are "stretched, overburdened, or nonexistent."
2 58 Fur-
ther, after removal from their mothers, the children are
placed in a foster care system that "is in a state of crisis."
259
Case loads in child protection agencies have increased to the
point where "Ic]ase workers ... are unable to supervise and
protect the children in their care," resulting in the placement
254. Id.; see also Nolan, supra note 83, at 20-21.
[S]ome analysts and legislatures have proposed extending the model of
child abuse and neglect into the fetal period. In theory, abuse and ne-
glect laws function to protect the interests of both children and fami-
lies, so that protecting fetuses and future children through this mecha-
nism would seem to be less punitive or coercive than bringing either
civil or criminal charges against women.
Id. (footnote omitted).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 164-203.
256. The evidence demonstrates that it is highly likely that the woman will
have another child. See supra text accompanying note 174.
257. See Terres, supra note 242, at 84.
258. Id.
259. Oberman, supra note 159, at 524. See also Terres, supra note 242, at 84
("In almost every area of the country, the child protection system is understaf-
fed, underpaid, and often inexperienced to deal with the deluge of child abuse
and neglect cases of recent years.").
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of children in overcrowded and dangerous shelters."260 This
warehousing "is a common response to newborns who have
tested positive for exposure to illicit substances."261 Thus,
children are removed from an unhealthy situation, often only
to be placed in a different unhealthy situation, with little
hope of their predicament changing in the near future.
III. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
A. The Proposed Legislation and Its Purpose
As the preceding section demonstrates, for a variety of
reasons, if states only implement the existing alternative so-
lutions to alleviate prenatal drug exposure, such legislation
will be ineffective and/or it will not produce significant re-
sults until well into the future. Thus, the states will fail to
protect as many children as soon as possible. The compre-
hensive drug treatment proposal will have a very limited im-
pact because it will reach only that small group of women
who voluntarily submit to treatment and voluntarily stay in
treatment. It does nothing to prevent the rest of the sub-
stance-abusing women from continuing to give birth to drug-
exposed children. For drug treatment to be effective, a way
must be found to bring the unwilling women into treatment
and keep them there long enough to receive some benefit.
Further, the substance-abusing women must stop getting
pregnant until they can provide a drug-free environment to
their developing children.
The second alternative solution, the current criminal
prosecution scheme, is flawed because it does not protect chil-
dren from prenatal drug exposure. Most of the prosecutions
never lead to lasting convictions, because the statutes used
are not designed to prohibit prenatal drug exposure. Fur-
ther, the threat of prosecution will not deter pregnant sub-
stance abusers. Finally, if a woman is jailed, such incarcera-
tion does not protect the developing child from harm, nor does
it prevent the woman from conceiving and prenatally expos-
ing another child to drugs upon her release. If criminal pros-
ecution is to work, it must be done pursuant to a statute that
specifically prohibits prenatal drug exposure. In addition,
the legislation must be designed to assist the mother, because
260. Oberman, supra note 159, at 525.
261. Id.
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only by assisting the mother can the state protect the devel-
oping fetus and future children.
The last alternative solution is the abuse/neglect scheme.
This scheme is incomplete because it also does not protect
children from drug exposure. The scheme takes a child away
after he or she is born and therefore provides no protection
when the child is being prenatally exposed to drugs. Further,
the scheme does not prevent the substance-abusing mother
from conceiving another child after the first one is taken
away.
The legislation proposed in this section is designed to fill
the gaps left by the alternative solutions. In order to begin to
address the problem of prenatal drug exposure, legislatures
need to implement legislation encompassing the elements
found in the following proposed legislation:
262
Section 1. Criminal Fetal Abuse
263
Any person who knowingly, or with reckless dis-
regard for the consequences, uses alcohol or uses con-
trolled substances not prescribed by a physician or
abuses controlled substances prescribed by a physi-
cian, where such use endangers the person or health
of an unborn child, shall be guilty of criminal fetal
abuse.
This statute does not encompass spontaneous
abortion of an unborn child in the first trimester
where such abortion is caused by substance use.
26 4
Section 2. Sentencing for Criminal Fetal Abuse
If a woman is found guilty of criminal fetal abuse,
she shall be sentenced as follows:
262. The proposed legislation is not intended to serve as a model for how
such a statute would ultimately be written. Rather, its purpose is to give a
general idea of the basic provisions of such a statute.
263. Portions of Section 1 were inspired by a sample statute discussed in
James Denison's article. See Denison, supra note 220, at 1121 ("Any person
who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or
death, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the consequences causes or per-
mits the person or health of a child in utero to be endangered by substance
abuse is guilty of criminal fetal abuse.").
264. Although one of the harms caused by substance abuse is spontaneous
abortion, this is not included in the crime, because as long as the spontaneous
abortion occurs within the constitutionally protected period, it is difficult to see
how the state can enjoin such behavior, at least in terms of protecting the fetus.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The state probably could enact regula-
tions to protect the health of the woman (i.e., enjoin the obtaining of an abortion
through the abuse of drugs or alcohol); however, discussion of such legislation is
beyond the scope of this article.
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(A) If she has given birth2 . to an abused
child, then she shall be given the choice of prison
or probation.266 If she chooses probation, in addi-
tion to any other conditions that the judge deems
appropriate, the judge shall condition the proba-
tion upon the following:
(1) enrollment in a drug treatment pro-
gram; and
(2) no pregnancy.
(B) If she has not yet given birth, then she
shall be civilly committed to an appropriate drug
rehabilitation program. After the child is born,
the judge shall review the treatment record and
determine whether probation with its attendant
mandatory conditions is necessary. If such pro-
bation is necessary, the judge shall sentence the
defendant to a probation term.
Section 3. Enrollment in Drug Treatment Center
If a woman at the time of arrest is actively partic-
ipating in an appropriate treatment center, such en-
rollment shall be a defense to the charge of criminal
fetal abuse.
The proposed legislation has a very narrow focus. Its
goal is to prevent any harm to the unborn child through ma-
ternal substance abuse and to start such prevention immedi-
ately. The state will achieve this first goal by targeting wo-
men who have had one substance-affected child and enjoining
them from further pregnancies until they are free from their
substance abuse problem.267 A subsidiary purpose is to fore-
stall further harm in those cases where some harm has al-
ready occurred. The state will achieve this goal through civil
commitment of pregnant substance abusers in a drug rehabil-
itation center.268
The proposed legislation is not designed to punish wo-
men 269 for engaging in fetal abuse, and therefore the state
265. The term "birth" is intended to encompass the birth of a stillborn child.
266. Instead of prosecution followed by probation, the legislature could allow
the woman to choose deferred prosecution or pretrial diversion. For a discus-
sion of both options, see infra note 293.
267. See proposed legislation Sections 1, 2(A), supra text accompanying
notes 263-266.
268. See proposed legislation Sections 1, 2(B), supra text accompanying
notes 263-266.
269. At a July 1990 conference of prosecutors, medical personnel, and treat-
ment and social services professionals, a "conference report indicated, in part,
334 [Vol. 34
335FETAL ABUSE
should make every effort to allow the affected non-pregnant
women to retain their freedom and to allow all of the women
to retain custody of their children. With such freedom, the
women who have already given birth to a drug-exposed infant
can take advantage of drug treatment and parenting classes
in order to properly care for their drug-exposed children.
In implementing the proposed legislation, the state must
keep in mind that the problem of prenatal drug exposure is a
complex one requiring a multidimensional approach. Thus, it
is paramount that the state view the legislation proposed in
this article as part of a larger plan. It should go hand in hand
with other programs to provide for the welfare of the woman,
her children, and her prospective children. For example, if
the legislation is to have any significant impact on prenatal
drug exposure, the state must allocate resources such that
women can obtain the help necessary to overcome their sub-
stance addiction prior to any pregnancy.2 70 In addition, once
an addicted woman becomes pregnant, society should provide
or make available at least the following: help for her addic-
tion, prenatal care, and training to care for the special needs
of her child once it is born. Finally, the proposed legislation
cannot be implemented unless the state provides the drug
treatment centers that are mandated within the
legislation.2 7
1
B. The Crime and the "Punishment"
To provide immediate protection for the unborn child,
this article proposes that the state make it a crime for a preg-
nant woman to use illicit drugs or alcohol or to abuse licit
drugs, where such use or abuse is likely to cause her to give
that prosecutors have an important positive role to play in developing and im-
plementing strategies to combat parental drug abuse, but that any approach
must be multidisciplinary and should be directed at treatment, not punish-
ment, of pregnant women." Paul A. Logli, The Prosecutor's Role in Solving the
Problems of Prenatal Drug Use and Substance Abused Children, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 559, 561-62 (1992).
270. It could be argued that ideally, humankind should strive for a society
where people are not driven to substance use or abuse. However, the motiva-
tions that lead to substance use or abuse are so varied that it is unlikely that we
will reach that point in the near future, if at all. It is also not clear to this
author that society has the right to prevent people from using various sub-
stances as long as that use does not harm others.
271. See proposed legislation Sections 2(A)-(B), supra text accompanying
notes 265-266.
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birth to a child that has suffered identifiable harm (including
stillbirths). 2 By making such behavior a crime, the state is
able to obtain jurisdiction over those women who will not or
cannot voluntarily submit to treatment and who simultane-
ously cannot or will not take care of their contraceptive
needs. It thus reaches those women whom the alternative so-
lutions outlined in Section II miss.
As stated above, the purpose of the proposed legislation
is not to punish the behavior, but rather to enjoin the behav-
ior for the protection of the unborn. As such, it runs counter
to "the almost universal misconception that 'prosecution'
means 'punishment' or 'incarceration.' ",273 Thus, the sen-
tence for the crime does not necessarily include jail time. If
the proposed legislation works as envisioned, it will not in-
clude jail time. In fact, the proposed legislation specifically
provides that the woman is to be given a choice between jail
and probation. 4 The jail term should be significantly less
than the probation term, thus providing the woman with a
real, if difficult, choice. While allowing for such a choice
might lead many women to choose jail, thus defeating the
overall purpose of the legislation, as the further discussion
will demonstrate, such a choice will forestall constitutional
infringement by the proposed legislation. In addition, it is
hoped, and experience tends to support this hope, that most
women will choose probation with, its all-important
conditions.
The probation is subject to a no-pregnancy condition and
a drug treatment condition.2 7 5 The no-pregnancy condition
forbids the woman from getting pregnant. As is discussed
272. See proposed legislation Section 1, supra text accompanying notes 263-
264. Some state legislatures have proposed legislation similar that proposed in
this article. See, e.g., Logli, supra note 140, at 27-28 (discussing H.B. 2835,
86th General Assembly, State of Illinois (1989 and 1990)). The proposed "stat-
ute provides for a class 4 felony disposition upon conviction" of the crime of
"Conduct Injurious To A Newborn" and that "[a] class 4 felony is a probation-
able felony" that can result in incarceration "from one to three years." Id.
273. Logli, supra note 269, at 562.
274. "Probation is the suspension of the imposition of a defendant's sentence
or the execution of that sentence prior to commitment." John C. Williams, An-
notation, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on Defendant's Remaining Child-
less or Having No Additional Children During Probationary Period, 94 A.L.R.
3d 1218 (1979).
275. Proposed legislation Section 2(A), supra text accompanying notes 264-
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more thoroughly below, through such conditions, the state
will begin immediately to protect against prenatal drug expo-
sure by delaying conception in appropriate circumstances un-
til the affected woman has controlled her drug abuse. The
following sections discuss the various elements of the pro-
posed legislation in more detail.
1. The Crime
While the proposed legislation is not designed to punish
the targeted women, it is coercive in nature and makes fetal
abuse a crime. Such coercion is necessary in order to reach
those women who cannot or will not seek assistance to protect
their developing children. As previously demonstrated, sim-
ply providing drug treatment to substance-abusing women
will not affect a large segment of the substance-abusing popu-
lation, because most will not avail themselves of such serv-
ices, or if they do avail themselves of such services, they will
not complete the program.276 The drug controls their lives.
Opponents of criminalization of prenatal drug exposure
in general argue that criminalization is based upon faulty as-
sumptions. These alleged assumptions are: (1) "pregnant ad-
dicts are indifferent to the health of their fetuses, or, alterna-
tively, . . . they willfully seek to cause them harm;"277 (2)
"drug treatment is available and pregnant women willfully
seek to avoid it;"278 and (3) "prosecution of pregnant drug
users will deter such women from alcohol and drug use."279
The impetus for the criminalization of this conduct is not,
however, based upon these assumptions.
In fact, the author does not believe that any of the as-
sumptions noted are generally valid assumptions. It is not
generally true that drug-addicted pregnant women are evil or
ill-intentioned.28 ° Most of the women are addicted and un-
able to help themselves.28 ' It is also not generally true that
drug treatment is available and pregnant women willfully
seek to avoid it. 28 2 Finally, as the proposed legislation recog-
276. See supra text accompanying notes 173-203.
277. See Moss, supra note 159, at 286.
278. Id. at 287.
279. Id. at 288.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 182, 189-193.
281. Id.
282. See discussion concerning the scarce supply of adequate treatment cen-
ters for pregnant women, supra text accompanying notes 164-171.
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nizes and takes into account, it is unlikely that an addicted
person will be generally deterred by criminalization of her
conduct.28 3
Criminalization is simply the most effective way to pro-
tect children from conduct that is seriously detrimental to the
health of those children. The criminalization is based upon
conduct that causes serious harm to another. Whether such
conduct was motivated by "evil" intentions or malice is
irrelevant.
Some may argue that the state should not make fetal
abuse by a drug or alcohol-addicted woman a crime because
the woman has not engaged in any voluntary conduct. They
could posit that addiction, unlike an isolated use, is involun-
tary and that the state cannot punish a woman for involun-
tary conduct. While they might concede that her conduct
would not necessarily be involuntary if drug treatment was
freely available and she chose not to obtain drug treatment,
they point out that drug treatment is not freely available.28 4
283. See supra text accompanying notes 227-231.
284. See Johnsen, supra note 164, at 606. "'[I]t would be injustice to punish
a pregnant woman for not receiving treatment for her substance abuse when
treatment is not an available option to her.'" Id. (quoting Board of Trustees,
Am. Medical Ass'n, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Med-
ical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Preg-
nant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2699 (1990)).
Some commentators have argued that this conduct should not be criminal-
ized because it would have a chilling effect upon the women, in that if the wo-
men fear prosecution, they would not seek prenatal care for themselves and
their unborn children. See, e.g., Kandall & Chavkin, supra note 160, at 640
(arguing that the possibility of prosecution may deter a woman from seeking
prenatal care); Schott, supra note 160, at 243 (stating that the "threat of crimi-
nal responsibility might drive women away from prenatal care"). The fears
cited are probably a fear of incarceration rather than prosecution, and as such
would not come into play because the proposed legislation would not lead to
incarceration except in the most egregious circumstances. See supra text ac-
companying notes 273-274. Thus, since most of the women genuinely want to
have healthy babies, see supra text accompanying note 191, and they need not
fear incarceration, the proposed legislation is not likely to have the chilling ef-
fect predicted by the commentators. In addition:
[t]he concern that pregnant addicts will avoid obtaining health care for
themselves or their infants because of the fear of prosecution cannot
justify the absence of "state action" to protect the newborn. If the state
were to accept such reasoning, then existing child abuse laws would
have to be reconsidered since they might deter parents from obtaining
medical care for physically or sexually abused children.
Logli, supra note 140, at 27. In the author's opinion, a concern for the unborn
child's welfare would in most instances override a drug-using woman's fear of
possible repercussions.
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They reason that the state cannot justify coercion where a
woman had no choice but to remain an addict because she
could not obtain drug treatment.28 5
As stated earlier, however, while the interest of the wo-
men in obtaining treatment for their addiction is very impor-
tant, it is not paramount. The fact of a person's addiction
does not mean that society should let that person engage in
whatever conduct she chooses, no matter how harmful that
conduct, simply because she is addicted. Therefore, if the
choice is between exempting women from their conduct due
to their inability to obtain treatment (and incidentally leav-
ing them free to engage in conduct that is harmful to their
children) and holding women liable for their conduct in order
to protect the children, the choice should be made in favor of
holding the women liable.
Further, the commentators' arguments ignore the pur-
pose of the proposed legislation. The harm to the unborn
child is the same whether the woman did not seek treatment
or tried to obtain treatment and failed. Since the purpose of
the legislation is to prevent recurrent births of drug-affected
children, it cannot differentiate between the two classes of
women in its coverage.28 6 If the purpose of the legislation
was punishment of the women, the legislation would need to
differentiate between the two categories of women; however,
that is not the case.
Second, critics would like us to treat pregnant substance
abusers much differently than we treat other members of our
society who harm individuals. The apparent philosophical
basis for the views of many commentators in this field is to
285. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 83, at 21:
It is worth considering whether any form of coercive state inter-
vention can be justified in the absence of non-coercive alternatives.
This question is particularly acute in terms of women and illegal drug
use because early evidence from several truly comprehensive drug
treatment programs holds out substantial promise for many women
completing pregnancy drug-free.
Id.
286. Of course, the legislation could differentiate between the women subse-
quently in terms of violation of probation and penalties for such violations. In
addition, ultimately the two categories of women would probably be differenti-
ated because the women who want to get off drugs and retain custody of their
children will comply with the program and eventually be free to become preg-
nant if they desire, while the women who are not interested will not comply
with the program and will not be free of the probation condition.
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protect the rights of the women involved at all costs. 2 7 To
the extent that these commentators seek to protect the rights
of the women at the expense of the rights of the drug-exposed
children, their philosophy is at odds with the philosophy of
this article. This philosophy is that, to the extent that the
women's rights can be vindicated without sacrificing those of
the children, those rights should be upheld. However, if the
two rights or interests conflict and a choice must be made, the
rights of the child should be protected over those of the wo-
man. While the woman may be a victim, unlike the child in-
volved, she is not an entirely blameless victim. Further,
while it may seem harsh to justify taking charge of an addict
who could not obtain treatment, our laws do this exact thing
in a variety of circumstances. While society does not punish a
person simply because she is an addict or an alcoholic, it does
punish a person for harmful conduct that stems from that
substance addiction or from other psychological or sociologi-
cal problems. If such conditions absolved an individual of all
responsibility for her conduct, almost all criminals would be
absolved. Society does not allow drunk drivers to escape pun-
ishment because they demonstrate that they are alcoholics.
It would also not let a person roam free if that person killed
someone and blamed the killing on the fact that she was on
drugs. It does not generally let a murderer escape commit-
ment because she was insane at the time of the murder.
While such illnesses may lead to civil commitment or treat-
ment rather than punishment, they do not forestall the recog-
nition, in some way, of a severe problem and a need to ad-
dress that problem. While pregnant women and their unborn
children do occupy a unique position that requires a unique
approach commensurate with that position, this uniqueness
should not and does not absolve these women from responsi-
bility for their actions.
In our society, it is not sufficient to say that one should
not be held responsible for her actions because society did not
help her to resolve her sickness. While society is becoming
more willing to address the problems that lead to many
crimes, it still generally believes that, to a certain extent,
people should be responsible for their actions and the conse-
quences of those actions. At some point, our society may
287. For the views of such commentators see, e.g., supra notes 159-160.
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reach utopia and be able to treat all criminals; however, we
have not yet reached that point.
Finally, while it is arguable that substance use while ad-
dicted is involuntary, engaging in unprotected sex, knowing
that there is a possibility of pregnancy, is not involuntary
conduct. If that intentional conduct leads to a pregnancy
where the child is harmed due to the woman's actions, the
state should hold her accountable. Therefore, the proposed
legislation requires all drug-using and -abusing women to
take care of their contraceptive needs such that their use and
abuse does not unintentionally lead to harm to an unborn
child. If they nevertheless get pregnant, the proposed legisla-
tion requires them to do everything within their power to as-
sure that the child suffers as little harm as possible. This
includes stopping the use of drugs. Thus, those women who
take care of their contraceptive needs are not liable under the
proposed legislation. Further, those women who protect their
child after they conceive are similarly not chargeable under
the proposed legislation. A woman commits criminal fetal
abuse only when she fails to take care of her contraceptive
needs and then fails to protect the child that she conceives.
2. Probation
The key aspect of the proposed legislation is the option of
probation. Most commentators, courts, and legislatures
agree that one of the primary purposes of probation is reha-
bilitation.28 8 In addition, due to a variety of factors that
288. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 539 (Or. 1978) (stating that the
"purposes of probation include rehabilitation and the freedom of the individual,
as long as these are consistent with public safety"); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAw
OF SENTENCING 100 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that the basic purpose of probation is
to "deter crime by rehabilitating unhardened offenders"); Jon A. Brilliant, Note,
The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Condi-
tions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1358 (discussing the fact that probation has reha-
bilitation as its primary goal); Brian C. Erb, Development in the Law, Creative
Probation Conditions: Putting the "Unusual" Back in "Cruel and Unusual" after
Bateman, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1155, 1157 (1988) ("[O]ne of the primary pur-
poses currently advanced by those favoring the imposition of probation is the
furtherance of the rehabilitation of criminals."); Jeffrey C. Filcik, Recent Devel-
opment, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291, 295 (1990) ("Traditionally, probation's purpose, justi-
fication and goal has been the defendant's rehabilitation.").
While our justice system believes that one of the purposes of incarceration
is rehabilitation, another primary purpose of incarceration is punishment. See
id. at 297 (arguing that a prison sentence is punishment, and the rationales for
1994]
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often make probation more attractive than prison, probation
has begun to be seen by some as a more humane alternative
to prison.289 It is endorsed in those cases where a more se-
vere sanction is unnecessary. 290 "Thus, changing attitudes
on probation suggest that, although rehabilitation remains a
driving force, probation is evolving into a broad, flexible
means of dispensing criminal justice. Likewise, criminal jus-
tice philosophy is expanding the use of probation as an af-
firmative correctional device and sentence."291 As such, the
use of probation in the proposed legislation is an ideal tool for
the unique situation of the substance-abusing woman-a wo-
man who needs to be specifically deterred but who poses no
danger to society at large.
Created by statute, probation is an alternative to incar-
ceration whereby the offender is not incarcerated, but her life
is subject to certain terms and conditions.292 Generally, "a
punishment are "retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation").
Some commentators argue that in the modern era the purpose of prison is not
rehabilitation, but rather, "retribution, education, deterrence, and incapacita-
tion." Brilliant, supra, at 1358 (citing Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-86 (1982 & Supp. V); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1982 & Supp. V)).
289. See State v. Christopher, 652 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Ariz. 1982); DILLINGHAM
ET AL., supra note 244, at 31 ("The use of probation has ... experienced increas-
ing acceptance as an alternative to incarceration. In 1980, of all adults
processed through the criminal justice system, approximately 60 percent were
given probation as opposed to the remaining 40 percent who were incarcer-
ated.") (citation omitted).
290. See Christopher, 652 P.2d at 1033.
291. Filcik, supra note 288, at 300.
292. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 283 (1991); see also State v. Culbertson, 563 P.2d 1224,
1228 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) ("Probation is a process of imposition of rehabilitative
and protective conditions upon a convict in lieu of taking away his liberty by
incarceration."); Erb, supra note 288, at 1156 ("State statutes generally author-
ize a trial court to grant probation as an alternative to the statutorily pre-
scribed punishment. In most cases, the result is that probation is granted in
lieu of a prison sentence.") (footnote omitted); Filcik, supra note 288, at 296
("[Slociety considers probation as an alternative to sentencing."); DILLINGHAM
ET AL., supra note 244, at 6 ("Probation is a judicially-imposed disposition which
suspends the imposition of an original sentence .... ).
Commentators and various jurisdictions disagree as to whether probation
is an alternative to sentencing or a sentence in and of itself. See Filcik, supra
note 288, at 296 & n.20 (noting that a number of states treat probation as a
sentence; e.g., Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire and New
Jersey). "The American Bar Association has urged (that probation be] viewed
as a sentence just like any other sentence." CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 102
(quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION 25
(1970)). In addition, "[t]he Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 makes
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probationer remains subject to all the civil disabilities that
normally flow from the conviction of a crime."293
The liberty allowed by probation and pretrial diversion is
conditioned on professional supervision,294 and while most
legislation does not require conditions of probation, it does
authorize court-imposed conditions that usually accompany a
grant of probation.295 Generally, if the probationer seriously
violates any provision of probation, a court may revoke proba-
tion and send her to jail.296
Because probation is created by statute, it is a privilege
rather than a right.29 v Consequently, while a court may al-
low an offender to refuse probation,298 courts have great dis-
probation a sentence in and of itself." See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMIS-
SION, supra, at 292 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3561). "The [Federal Sentencing Re-
form] Act of [1984] treats probation as a sentence rather than a sentencing al-
ternative." Filcik, supra note 288, at 300.
293. CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 105. In addition to probation, some states
allow what is known as pretrial diversion. Id. Others allow for deferred prose-
cution. Id. at n.38. For purposes of this article, pretrial diversion and deferred
prosecution are included as possible options for the woman charged under the
proposed legislation. See supra text accompanying notes 263-266.
Under pretrial diversion the defendant enters a guilty plea, but unlike pro-
bation, the judge withholds "registering [the plea] as a formal judgment of con-
viction." CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 105. The accused is then placed in a
diversion program that is similar to probation. Id. Pretrial diversion is attrac-
tive to a defendant because it allows her to avoid a criminal record if she com-
plies with all the terms and conditions of the program. See id. (noting that if
the accused completes the program, the court permits her to withdraw her
guilty plea, and then the court dismisses the case).
"Deferred prosecution is a system under which a prosecutor refrains from
filing a formal criminal charge if the alleged offender complies with certain con-
ditions, such as a drug treatment program[,] parenting classes," or no preg-
nancy. Logli, supra note 269, at 563.
294. See Filcik, supra note 288, at 294; DILLINGHAM ET AL., supra note 244,
at 6.
295. See CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 111-12; see also, e.g., UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 292, § 5B1.4(a)-(b) (listing "standard" and
"special" conditions of probation).
296. See Filcik, supra note 288, at 294; DILLINGHAM ET AL., supra note 244,
at 6.
297. See Filcik, supra note 288, at 301; see also State v. Christopher, 652
P.2d 1031, 1034 (Ariz. 1982) (quoting State v. Smith, 542 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. 1975)
(noting that probation is "a matter of grace and not of right"); CAMPBELL, supra
note 288, at 108-09 (arguing that the ability to receive probation is statutorily
determined, and states can and do restrict probation to certain classes of
offenders).
298. See CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 105 ("[TIhe majority of states which
have passed on the issue hold an offender has the right to refuse probation with
its attendant constitutional restrictions and instead demand the customary al-
ternative of incarceration."). But see State v. Lynch, 394 N.W.2d 651, 662 (Neb.
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cretion in deciding who will receive probation and what the
terms and conditions of that probation will be.299 This broad
discretion is limited only by a statutory requirement of rea-
sonableness, and in some cases, by constitutional concerns.3z°
3. Conditions of Probation
As stated above, one of the purposes of probation is to
rehabilitate the probationer. Thus, to aid the probationer in
this process of successfully reforming herself and reinte-
grating herself into the community, courts impose probation
conditions.30 1  Since, however, the probationer has
threatened public safety by committing a crime, courts also
design probation conditions to promote respect for the law, to
deter further criminal conduct, and to protect the public from
further crimes.30 2 Many state statutes provide for certain
general and specific conditions that judges may impose upon
a probationer.30 3 The condition of drug treatment is often one
of the conditions provided for by statute.30 4 The statutes as
well as case law also give the trial judges broad discretion to
design probation conditions that are not specifically listed but
are appropriate to the probationer's particular situation and
promote rehabilitation or protect the public. 3 5 A no-preg-
nancy condition falls into this latter category.
1986) (quoting State v. Kinney, 350 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. 1984) ("'[P]robation is a
sentence and not part of a quasi-contract wherein the court offers something
which the defendant is free to accept or reject ....' "); State v. Crites, 689 P.2d
353 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that defendant could not refuse probation).
299. See Filcik, supra note 288, at 301-02; CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 109.
300. See infra text accompanying notes 374-421.
301. See Filcik, supra note 288, at 295.
302. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 292, at 283; see
also Erb, supra note 288, at 1155 (noting that many judges are "aware of the
need to control [probationers] who 'serve their sentence' while at large in
society").
303. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 292, at
§ 5B1.4(a)-(b) (providing for "standard" conditions that are generally recom-
mended and "special" conditions that are recommended, or required by law, or
may be appropriate); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1)-(2) (1991) (explaining that
probation is subject to certain "general conditions unless specifically deleted by
... court"; the court "may impose special conditions ... for the protection of the
public or reformation of the offender, or both"); see also Erb, supra note 288, at
1157.
304. See infra text accompanying note 373.
305. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing that "sentencing court has broad discretion to describe conditions of proba-
tion to foster rehabilitation and to protect the public to the end that justice may
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be done"); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
the "[t]rial court[ I ha[s] broad discretion to impose various conditions of proba-
tion" as long as such conditions are related to rehabilitation of the probationer);
State v. Culbertson, 563 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the
generality of Oregon law "indicates an intention to grant to the court the
broadest possible power to formulate appropriate conditions in each case"); see
also, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 292, § 5B1.3(b)
("The court may impose other conditions that (1) are reasonably related to the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, and the purposes of sentencing and (2) involve only such depriva-
tions of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of
sentencing."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-303(c)(10) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991) (ex-
plaining that the court may require defendant to "[slatisfy any other conditions
reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restric-
tive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-204(2)(1) (West 1986) (explaining that the court may require de-
fendant to "[s]atisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilita-
tion and the purposes of probation"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(11)
(West Supp. 1992) (noting that the court may require defendant to "satisfy any
other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation"); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 706-624(2)(n) (Supp. 1992) (explaining that a court may require defendant to
"[s]atisfy other reasonable conditions as the court may impose"); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(14) (Bums 1992) (explaining that a court may require de-
fendant to "[slatisfy other conditions reasonably related to the person's rehabili-
tation"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2-A)(M) (West 1983) (explaining
that a court may require defendant to "satisfy any other conditions reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of the convicted person or the public safety or se-
curity"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(b)(12) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (explaining
that a court may require defendant to "satisfy any other conditions reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his
liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience"); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 65.10(2)(1) (McKinney 1987) (explaining that a court may require defendant to
"[s]atisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(bl)(10) (1992) (noting that a court may require defend-
ant to "[s]atisfy any other conditions determined by the court to be reasonably
related to his rehabilitation"); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(2) (1991) (explaining
that a "court may impose special conditions of probation for the protection of the
public or reformation of the offender, or both, including, but not limited to,"
certain listed conditions); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(13) (1982) (noting
that a court may require defendant to "satisfy any other conditions reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his
liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
35-303(d)(9) (Supp. 1992) (explaining that a court may require defendant to
"[slatisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the purpose of the of-
fender's sentence and not unduly restrictive of the offender's liberty, or incom-
patible with the offender's freedom of conscience, or otherwise prohibited by
this chapter"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252(b)(13) (1986) (noting that a court
may require defendant to "[s]atisfy any other conditions reasonably related to
his rehabilitation").
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a. No-Pregnancy Condition
An essential part of the proposed legislation is the no-
pregnancy condition of probation.30 6 As previously demon-
strated, a major gap in the alternative solutions is that they
fail to prevent a woman from giving birth to a number of
drug-exposed children. If society is to protect as many chil-
dren as possible from any harm, it must prevent the birth of
additional substance-exposed children while the woman is
getting her substance abuse problem under control. The
existence of a drug-exposed fetus or child is presumptive evi-
dence that a drug-using woman either cannot or will not take
care of her contraceptive needs while she is using drugs.30 v
Therefore, the state must assist her.
Apart from constitutional and policy concerns, 30 8 a logis-
tical problem exists concerning how to implement the no-
pregnancy condition. Since the women cannot or will not
take care of their contraceptive needs, simply imposing a no-
pregnancy condition is unlikely to significantly reduce the
number of drug-exposed children. There are two alternatives
that a state could employ to ensure fewer violations of the no-
pregnancy condition. The court could order a woman to re-
ceive a Norplant implant as a part of the condition, or it could
give a woman a choice of contraceptives (including Norplant)
that the state would provide to her free of charge. As the fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates, the latter alternative is cur-
rently the better one and the one that should become a part of
the proposed legislation.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 263-266, 273-275.
307. As one woman who had given birth to a drug-exposed infant com-
mented, although she succeeded in getting off drugs on her own and loves moth-
erhood, she states she did not:
have much faith that other addicts [would] follow her path. "I know
women who have had numerous babies born addicted and they just let
them go to the state or a relative, or they keep them so that they can
get welfare," she says. "I feel that the courts should make these wo-
men use some kind of birth control, and if they don't, they should be
fixed because it's the children who are going to suffer."
Klein, supra note 140, at El.
308. See discussion infra parts IV and V.
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(1) Norplant Implant
The Norplant contraceptive system "consists of six flexi-
ble Silastic capsules. "309 resembling match-stick-size
straws,31 ° which "are surgically inserted into a woman's up-
per arm."31 ' Once inserted, the capsules release levonorges-
trel, a synthetic hormone that is used in oral contracep-
tives. 312 The implant costs between $500313 and $700314 and
lasts for five years.315 Norplant "imparts a degree of protec-
tion against pregnancy that is comparable to sterilization,"
yet the effects "stop immediately after removal."316 Since
Norplant is administered automatically, pregnancy cannot
occur due to human error, as can occur with other contracep-
tives. Thus, Norplant is probably the most effective contra-
ceptive currently on the market.3 17 Such effectiveness, cou-
pled with the elimination of human error, makes Norplant
very attractive in terms of preventing a drug-using woman
from conceiving. In addition, an implant lasts five years and
costs only approximately $750, further adding to its
attractiveness.318
However, Norplant is a relatively new contraceptive
without a long history of use in the United States.319 Thus,
the long-term effects of the implant are not known. In fact,
many women's health groups have asserted that the Federal
Drug Administration (FDA) should not have approved Nor-
plant until it knew the drug's long-term effects. 320 These fac-
tors raise serious policy concerns about ordering a woman to
use such an implant, even if she chooses the probation option.
309. G.R. Huggins, Obstetrics and Gynecology, 265 JAMA 3139 (1991).
310. Gene Garaygordobil, Prosecutors Side with Defendant in Norplant Case,
Gannett News Service, June 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WIRES File.
311. Tim Rutten, Norplanting or Supplanting Private Rights, L.A. TIMES,
May 31, 1991, at El.
312. Id.; See also Huggins, supra note 309, at 3139.
313. See Stephanie Denmark, Birth-Control Tyranny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1991, at 23.
314. See Rutten, supra note 311, at El.
315. New Norplant Contraceptive Technique Taught at UCI, PR Newswire,
June 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. The Food and Drug Administration approved Norplant on December 10,
1990. Huggins, supra note 309, at 3139.
320. Denmark, supra note 313, at 23.
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(2) Choice of Contraceptives Supplied by the
State
The state can also ensure fewer violations of the no-preg-
nancy condition by providing the woman with a choice of con-
traceptives, including Norplant, free of charge. This solution
is preferred because, if administered correctly, it can be al-
most as effective as the Norplant alternative, but it does not
run afoul of the policy concerns raised by that alternative.
Under this alternative, the woman is not obligated to
take any of the contraceptives offered. However, the court
would apprise the woman of the harsh penalties (jail or civil
commitment) that will arise if she becomes pregnant. The
court would also inform the woman that it will impose the jail
penalty even if the woman becomes pregnant and has an
abortion. Since the condition is no pregnancy, it is not neces-
sary for the woman to carry the pregnancy to term before the
woman violates probation. Simply becoming pregnant is suf-
ficient.3 21 Finally, the court would remind the woman that if
she goes to jail, the state will place any children that she has
in foster care. With all of this information, the woman can
then make an informed choice as to what contraceptive, if
any, will best suit her needs. Given this information, many
women will decide that a Norplant implant best serves their
needs, thus reducing the probable number of probation viola-
tions. With such self-selection, however, the state does not
run into the problem of ordering a particular contraceptive.
Since a possibility of pregnancy exists with all contracep-
tives, the court will be faced with the question of what pun-
ishment, if any, follows a violation of probation. If the woman
has decided to obtain an abortion, then there is no need to
provide her with any special treatment. If, however, the wo-
man has decided to carry the child to term, the unborn child
may suffer harm if the woman is incarcerated.2 2 Therefore,
the sentence for violation of probation in such a case should
be civil commitment to a drug treatment center rather than
incarceration. After the pregnancy ends, the woman should
be freed from civil commitment, unless it is proven that she
321. Thus, a woman is unlikely to have an abortion simply to avoid incarcer-
ation. If she obtains an abortion, it will be because she wants one, not because
she was coerced by the circumstances.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 233-243.
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willfully violated the probation condition. In such a case, the
civil commitment may be followed by a jail term.
b. Drug and/or Alcohol Treatment Condition
Another important part of the proposed legislation is the
requirement that the probationer receive drug and/or alcohol
treatment for her substance abuse problem. Without such
treatment, it is unlikely that she will be able to overcome her
substance abuse problem. In addition, without such treat-
ment, it is likely that the birth of another substance-affected
child will only be postponed and not prevented.
IV. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Making fetal abuse a crime arguably implicates a
number of constitutional issues. In addition, imposing drug
treatment and no-pregnancy conditions of probation arguably
implicates a number of statutory and constitutional issues.
The general framework of the constitutional debate in this
area is "the proper balance between competing interests: the
desire to protect individual liberties while recognizing a citi-
zen's obligations to the community, and society's interest in
encouraging, and in some instances forcing, responsible be-
havior."323 This balancing recognizes that while some rights
are important, and in some instances fundamental, they do
not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are limited by their at-
tendant responsibilities and the rights of others.
324
The proposed legislation raises three constitutional ques-
tions. First, by making it a crime to use or abuse drugs while
pregnant, does the state violate a woman's fundamental right
to privacy as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 325 and/or the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 326 Second, by making
it a crime to use or abuse drugs while pregnant, does the
323. Michael Kramer, Who Owes What to Whom?, TIME, Oct. 14, 1991, at 32.
324. See Robert C. Cetrulo & Amy E. Dougherty, The Right to Life: The Most
Fundamental Right, Ky. BENCH & B., Summer 1990, at 22, 28 ("All human
'rights' have correlative 'responsibilities.' The legitimate parameter of one's
right to swing one's fist was always, prior to Roe v. Wade, the other person's
nose!").
325. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, libery, or property,
without due process of law...." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
326. "[N]or deny any person ... the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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state violate a woman's right to equal protection of the
laws?327 And third, does the state violate a woman's funda-
mental right to procreate 328 by providing a no-pregnancy pro-
bation option under the proposed legislation?
Further, the proposed legislation raises the question of
whether the probation conditions violate the statutory re-
quirement of reasonableness.
In answering these questions, the discussion demon-
strates that the proposed legislation is neither constitution-
ally nor statutorily infirm.
A. The Crime
1. Right to Privacy-Dimensions
Justice Louis Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in Olm-
stead v. United States, 329 stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen-
sations. They conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.330
This right has been described as the right to privacy. 331
While the Constitution does not expressly provide for a right
to privacy, the judiciary has found such a right from a variety
of sources. 332 This right has been described as "a right to en-
327. Id.
328. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
329. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 478. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 15.3, 1302, 1309 (2d ed. 1988).
331. See, e.g, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Tribe, supra note 330 at
1309.
332. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 330, § 15.3, at 1308-09:
[The right has been found] in the "liberty" protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. [It has] also been cut
from the cloth of the ninth amendment ... or from the privileges and
immunities clauses of article IV and of the fourteenth amendment....
[It has] materialized from the "emanations" and "penumbras" most re-
cently dubbed simply the "shadows" of the first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendments. [It] elaborate[s] the "blessings of liberty" promised in
350 [Vol. 34
FETAL ABUSE
gage in certain highly personal activities. More specifically,
it currently relates to certain rights of freedom of choice in
marital, sexual, and reproductive matters."333 While the
right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is not an absolute
right.3 3 4 Fundamental rights do not and cannot exist in a
vacuum. In a civilized society, it has been generally recog-
nized that in any place where more than one person exists,
the rights and interests of different individuals will conflict.
Thus, an essential corollary to the existence of one person's
right is the right of others not to suffer harm through the ex-
ercise of that right.3 35 The state may therefore infringe upon
fundamental rights if it does so in order to promote a compel-
ling state interest. Thus, if the state's action infringes upon
one of these rights, it will be upheld if it withstands strict
scrutiny under either the Due Process Clause and/or, in ap-
propriate cases, the Equal Protection Clause. 336 That is, the
state's action will pass constitutional muster if the state can
demonstrate that a compelling interest for such a law exists
and that the law is narrowly tailored to effectuate such
interest.3 3
7
The legislation proposed in this article is constitutional
because it does not infringe upon a woman's fundamental
right to privacy. In addition, even if the legislation did in-
fringe upon a woman's fundamental right to privacy, the leg-
islation would pass constitutional muster because in the cir-
the Preamble, and [has] been held implicit in the eighth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
Id.
333. See John E. Nowak and RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 14.26, at 757 (4th ed. 1991).
334. See TRIBE, supra note 330, § 15.3, at 1308:
[There is] a bleak conservatism, in designing and defending any abso-
lute right. Any fundamental rights of personhood and privacy too pre-
cisely or inflexibly defined defy the seasons and are likely to be by-
passed by the spring floods. The best we can hope for is to encourage
wise reflection through strict scrutiny of any government action ...
that appears to transgress what it means to be human at a given time
and place.
Id. (footnote omitted).
335. See supra text accompanying note 324; see also Phillip E. Johnson, The
ACLU Philosophy and the Right to Abuse the Unborn, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Win-
ter/Spring 1990, at 48, 51 ("Rights are excellent concepts if placed within a
larger framework of personal responsibility, but a philosophy that pays no at-
tention to anything but rights is a license for self-indulgence.").
336. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 333, § 11.7, at 388.
337. See id. § 14.3, at 575.
3511994]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
cumstances covered by the proposed legislation, the state has
a compelling interest in prohibiting the woman from exercis-
ing her rights in an irresponsible manner, to the serious det-
riment of her unborn child and her possible future children.
a. No Fundamental Right Involved
Some commentators have contended that a statute
criminalizing a woman's conduct during pregnancy unconsti-
tutionally infringes upon the woman's fundamental right to
privacy.3 s One commentator has gone as far as to argue that
"any governmental action that... plac[es] special restrictions
on women based solely on their role in childbearing must be
strictly scrutinized, even though the Constitution does not
protect as fundamental the right to engage in many activities
potentially affected."339 In arguing that the right to privacy
is implicated, these commentators contend that the right to
privacy encompasses either a fundamental right "to make de-
cisions that affect the spheres of family, marriage, and pro-
"1340 fudcreation, or a fundamental right to "control one's own
body."34 1 Contrary to the assertions of these commentators,
however, the Court has not provided a general definition of
the right to privacy. Thus, there does not exist a general fun-
338. See Glink, supra note 218, at 562 (arguing that the right to privacy is
involved in criminal prosecutions of women for drug use during pregnancy); see
also Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminal-
ization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARv. L. REV. 994, 998 (1988) ("Fetal abuse stat-
utes should be subject to strict scrutiny because they infringe upon a woman's
constitutionally protected right to privacy."); Schott, supra note 160, at 230 (ar-
guing that a statute that proscribes fetal harm must be drawn narrowly enough
to meet the constitutional requirements of Roe v. Wade).
339. Johnsen, supra note 164, at 586.
340. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 338, at 998; see
also Glink, supra note 218, at 562 (arguing that the fact that "[t]he right to
privacy also includes the right to make decisions affecting the spheres of family
and marriage free from government intrusion" means that the right to privacy
would encompass a woman's decisions concerning her pregnancy).
341. Glink, supra note 218, at 562. (noting that one aspect of the right to
privacy is "the right to control one's own body"); see also Wilkins, supra note
159, at 1420:
Although none of the[ ] [Supreme Court cases involving the right to
privacy] directly addresses prenatal behavior (other than abortion),
they indicate that, in certain arenas, the right to privacy prevents
courts from substituting their own judgments for those of individuals.
A woman's choices about what to do with her body during pregnancy
should be accorded the same protection given to other decisions regard-
ing reproduction and family life.
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damental right to privacy or autonomy.342 Rather, the judici-
ary has carved out a number of constitutionally protected
zones of privacy.343 The rights encompassed by these zones of
privacy are deemed to be fundamental rights. In the author's
opinion, because the conduct criminalized by the proposed
legislation does not fall within any of the recognized zones of
privacy, it does not infringe upon any fundamental right of
privacy.
In the area of family matters, the Court has said that the
right to privacy encompasses a parent's right to make certain
decisions concerning his child's education.344 In addition, it
has found that a fundamental right exists in the parent-child
relationship such that "states must guarantee a parent sig-
nificant procedural safeguards against improper termination
of the parent-child relationship, including a requirement that
the parental unfitness be proven by 'clear and convincing' evi-
dence."345 Further, with regard to marriage, the Court has
found that to a certain extent, freedom of choice concerning
marriage or divorce is a fundamental right.346 The proposed
legislation contains no provisions concerning education, ter-
mination of the parent-child relationship, or marriage. It
therefore does not infringe upon the aspect of the right to pri-
vacy that relates to family matters or marriage.
In the area of procreation, the Court has recognized that
"[tihe decision whether to beget or not to beget or bear a child
342. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 333, § 14.26, at 757 (The Court "has
not recognized any general right to engage in sexual activities that are done in
private. Instead, the justices have acknowledged the existence of a 'right' and
defined it by very specific application to laws relating to reproduction, contra-
ception, abortion, and marriage.").
343. See id. (explaining that the right to privacy currently encompasses "cer-
tain rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual, and reproductive matters").
344. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding
that a statute that required students to attend public rather than private
schools violates the Due Process Clause); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403
(1923) (finding a statute forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in any
school violates the Due Process Clause).
345. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 333, § 14.28, at 768; see also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 752-54 (1982) (reiterating the need for clear and
convincing evidence).
346. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding recognized
the fundamental right to marry in invalidating divorce restrictions); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding a statute that prohibited white persons
from marrying any non-white person violated the fundamental right to marry);
see also NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 333, § 14.28 at 763-65.
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is at the very heart of... [the] cluster of constitutionally pro-
tected choices" encompassed by the right to privacy.347 Thus,
the Court has invalidated laws that authorized the steriliza-
tion of certain convicted criminals,348 laws that restricted the
use of contraceptives by married persons,349 laws that re-
stricted the distribution of contraceptives to married and un-
married persons, 350 and laws that infringed upon a woman's
right to choose an abortion.351 In criminalizing fetal abuse,
the proposed legislation does not authorize the sterilization of
any woman,352 nor does it infringe upon a woman's choice as
to whether to get pregnant or whether to terminate a preg-
nancy. Rather, it provides that if a woman conceives a child,
she has an obligation to refrain from using and/or abusing
alcohol, licit drugs, and illicit drugs. As such, criminalization
of fetal abuse does not infringe upon the right to privacy as it
relates to procreation.
Finally, in terms of the right to control one's own body,
apart from the privacy cases discussed above, the only rele-
vant cases would appear to be those that derive a right of
bodily integrity from the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.353 The proposed
legislation does not, however, authorize any state intrusion
into a woman's body and therefore does not implicate the
right of bodily integrity.
None of the above-enumerated interests are implicated
by the crime of fetal abuse as outlined in the proposed legisla-
tion. Quite simply, the proposed legislation makes it a crime
for a woman to use or abuse certain substances while preg-
nant. Because the Court has recognized neither a general
fundamental right of personal autonomy nor a privacy right
347. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
348. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
349. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
350. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Carey, 431 U.S. at
686.
351. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
352. The constitutional implications of the no-pregnancy probation condition
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 399-421.
353. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment protected against "intrusions into the human
body" "which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-174 (1952) (holding
that a conviction obtained through the use of evidence garnered by pumping the
suspect's stomach offended the Due Process Clause).
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to abuse alcohol, to use illicit drugs, or to abuse licit drugs,354
the proposed legislation does not violate any constitutionally
protected fundamental right. As one commentator has stated
quite succinctly:
Both the state's interests in fetal life and in fetal
health are legitimate and coexist prior to viability. Given
the nature of the maternal rights against which these
state interests are opposed, however, courts can give force
to the state's interest in fetal health before they give force
to the state's interest in fetal life.
Accepting the argument that a prenatal-duty rule
would not violate a woman's right to abort, it also would
not impinge upon the type of intimate decision making
created by the right of privacy. The right of privacy pro-
tects women in their decisions not to conceive, or, having
conceived, not to bear the child. The right to make these
intimate decisions protects women from having to assume
a responsibility which they may not desire to undertake.
Regardless of one's personal view on the use of contracep-
tives and abortion, no one can deny that requiring a wo-
man to bear a child against her will can have a lasting
and potentially devastating impact upon her. By contrast,
preventing a woman from acting in ways detrimental to
her fetus does not protect her interests in such a funda-
mental manner. Whether or not a woman ultimately de-
cides to bear a child, requiring her to insure that if born,
her child will be healthy, is not detrimental to her long-
354. Development in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv.
L. REV. 1519, 1580-81 (1990) [hereinafter Development in the Law]. See also
Denison, supra note 220, at 1135 ("[Tlhe decision to abuse drugs does not qual-
ify for [constitutional] protection."); Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance
Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1209, 1220 (1987) ("[Tlhe use of alcohol, tobacco and illicit drugs are not funda-
mental rights. The use of alcohol and tobacco is a mere privilege, and the use of
illicit drugs is a crime."); Keyes, supra note 159, at 228 ("[Tlhe Court is unlikely
to view perinatal substance abuse as a part of a broad fundamental right to
reproductive privacy. Instead, the Court might define the right at issue to be
the right to abuse drugs and alcohol while pregnant, and discover no such right
in history or tradition.").
The proposed legislation does not infringe upon a woman's right to an abor-
tion, because "the issue arises only if the woman decides to continue the preg-
nancy." John Robertson, "Fetal Abuse": Should We Recognize It as a Crime?,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 38; see also In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Fain.
Ct. 1985). Roe v. Wade should not deny the state "'the power to grant legal
recognition to the unborn in non-14th Amendment situations.'" Id. (quoting
John E.B. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
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term self interest. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be
true. A woman who is not prepared to raise a healthy
child is even less prepared to raise one with a serious
birth defect.3 55
Recognizing that the case of fetal abuse does not fit
within the fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme
Court, some commentators have extrapolated from the pri-
vacy cases a fundamental right to make personal decisions in
all areas related to reproduction.3 15  The Court has, however,
expressed an unwillingness to "discover new fundamental
rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause."357 Given this
reluctance and the Court's history of defining fundamental
rights in terms of specific narrowly defined categories, it is
unlikely that the Court would recognize a fundamental right
to make personal decisions in all areas related to reproduc-
tion, especially where that right would encompass the right
to ingest harmful substances that serve no useful purpose
and that would in fact be harmful to the pregnant woman and
her unborn child. 5s
b. A Compelling State Interest
Even if a fundamental right was implicated, the pro-
posed legislation would still pass constitutional muster, be-
cause the state is pursuing a compelling state interest and
the legislation is narrowly tailored to promote that interest.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the state has a com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life359 and that this in-
terest exists throughout the pregnancy. 6° As the preceding
sections have demonstrated, the proposed legislation is
355. Maxwell Stearns, Maternal Duties During Pregnancy, 21 NEW ENG. L.
REV., 595, 604-05 (1985-86).
356. See, e.g., Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 338, at
998; Wilkins, supra note 159, at 1420.
357. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1985).
358. See Keyes, supra note 159, at 228 ("[Tlhe Court is unlikely to view per-
inatal substance abuse as a part of a broad fundamental right to reproductive
privacy. Instead, the Court might define the right at issue to be the right to
abuse drugs and alcohol while pregnant, and discover no such right in history
or tradition.").
359. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) ("The
state's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viabil-
ity."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992) (rejecting the
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade because it, inter alia, undervalued the
state's interest in potential life); see also Keyes, supra note 159, at 227.
360. See supra note 359.
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designed to further this interest by protecting unborn chil-
dren from exposure to substances that can cause serious, and
in some cases devastating, harm to those children-harm
that may potentially affect such a child's entire life. Bal-
anced against this interest is the woman's interest in using
illicit drugs and abusing alcohol and licit drugs. The use of
illicit drugs is a crime. Further, the abuse of alcohol and licit
drugs is condoned rather than encouraged by the state.
Therefore, given the nature of the interests involved, it is not
difficult to see how the balance weighs heavily in favor of the
state.
36 1
Further, the proposed legislation is narrowly tailored to
advance this interest. The legislation targets only women
who abuse substances and who do not take care of their con-
traceptive needs. 62 In addition, as Section II of this article
demonstrates, the alternative solutions are incomplete or
flawed in many important ways; consequently, the proposed
legislation is necessary if the state is to protect as many chil-
dren as possible from in utero drug exposure.
2. Equal Protection
Women affected by the proposed legislation might con-
tend that the law discriminates on the basis of gender and is
therefore subject to heightened, or intermediate-level, scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 63 In arguing
against prosecution for prenatal drug exposure, one commen-
tator contends that such prosecutions "directed at women
who use drugs and alcohol during pregnancy represent an-
other context in which only women have been penalized, de-
spite evidence that alcohol and drug use ... by men can cause
361. See Glink, supra note 218, at 568 (noting that the use of illegal drugs is
a crime, not a fundamental right).
If abortion, a fundamental right, can be regulated in the interest of
potential life during certain periods of a woman's pregnancy, then the
state should be given greater power to restrict conduct that enjoys no
protected status at all, especially when that conduct presents a clear
threat to fetal development.
Id.
362. See supra section III.B.1.
363. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing intermediate scru-
tiny for gender-based discrimination); see also Oberman, supra note 159, at 527
(arguing that "if a law governing the use of controlled substances by [pregnant]
women were challenged as discriminatory today, it would be reviewed under
heightened (or intermediate level) scrutiny").
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harm to their future children through the negative effect on
sperm."
3 64
Such an equal protection argument would fail for at least
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court "has been skeptical of
gender discrimination claims based on pregnancy."365 In
Geduldig v. Aiello,366 the Court differentiated "between clas-
sifications based on gender and classifications based on bio-
logical differences such as pregnancy."367 Thus, discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy does not constitute gender
discrimination, but rather, discrimination between pregnant
and non-pregnant persons. 68 Therefore, because the pro-
posed legislation seeks only to govern the conduct of pregnant
substance abusers, it is unlikely that a court will find that
the legislation discriminates on the basis of gender, whereby
the legislation would be subjected to a heightened level of
scrutiny.
In addition, even if it is agreed that the proposed legisla-
tion makes a gender classification, and even if it is assumed
that a man's drug use can harm his sperm,369 the classifica-
tion would not be discriminatory because, in terms of the con-
duct proscribed by the statute, men and women are not "simi-
larly situated." The conduct that is prohibited by the statute
is the ingestion of drugs while pregnant. Because men can-
not become pregnant, they cannot engage in the same type of
conduct and are therefore not "similarly situated."
Men and women could be "similarly situated" if research
demonstrates that drug use damages both sperm and eggs.
In such a case, if the law prohibited a woman from using
drugs because of damage to her eggs, and did not prohibit
men from engaging in similar conduct, men and women
would then be "similarly situated" in terms of the statute,
and gender discrimination would exist. This research, how-
364. Johnsen, supra note 164, at 608.
365. See Development in the Law, supra note 354, at 1581 (citing Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
366. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
367. Id.
368. See Glink, supra note 218, at 562.
369. This is a significant assumption, given that research is just beginning to
be conducted concerning the impact of drug use on sperm. See Balisy, supra
note 354, at 1232 ('There has been little conclusive evidence that a [correlation
between fraternal substance abuse and fetal disorders] can be inferred from
male substance abuse.").
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ever, does not presently exist. The proposed legislation does
not focus on genetic harm to eggs and sperm.37 0 Further,
even if the proposed legislation was subject to heightened
scrutiny, it would withstand such scrutiny, because, as previ-
ously discussed, the state's interests are not only impor-
tant,371 but are compelling.
37 2
B. The Punishment
As stated earlier, an integral part of the proposed legisla-
tion is the option of probation with the dual conditions of no
pregnancy and of drug treatment. It is likely that an offender
will challenge this portion of the legislation as well, both on
statutory and constitutional grounds. However, as the fol-
lowing section demonstrates, such probation conditions are
legitimate both statutorily and constitutionally. In addition,
granting probation accompanied by such conditions is desira-
ble from a policy standpoint.
As discussed earlier, the conditions of probation that
courts will impose pursuant to the proposed statute include a
no-pregnancy condition and a drug treatment condition.
Since the drug treatment condition is unlikely to meet much
resistance, it will be discussed first.
If a probationer challenges such a condition, she would
meet with little success. Many state statutes specifically pro-
vide for or recommend enrollment in a drug treatment pro-
gram as a condition of probation for those probationers who
have a substance abuse problem.373
370. Whether the state could, in fact, constitutionally focus on such harm is
beyond the scope of this article. If, however, the state could focus on such harm,
and such harm did occur, any statute designed to address such conduct would
need to cover both men and women.
371. Under heightened scrutiny, the state must demonstrate a substantial
relationship to an important state interest. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
333, § 14.20, at 735. See also Metro Broadcasting Inc., v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547,
620 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 359-362.
373. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 292,
§ 5B1.4(b)(23).
If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of
narcotics, other controlled substances or alcohol, it is recommended
that the court impose a condition requiring the defendant to partici-
pate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office for
substance abuse, which program may include testing to determine
whether the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol.
3591994]
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Unlike the drug treatment condition, however, the no-
pregnancy condition is novel and controversial. Conse-
quently, probationers will likely challenge it on both statu-
tory and constitutional grounds.
1. Statutory Limitations
As stated earlier, the courts have broad discretion in im-
posing conditions of probation.3 74 Appellate courts generally
overturn such conditions only when they fail to satisfy the
traditional statutory requirement of relating reasonably to
the purpose of the probation statute.375 As one commentator
explains; "[p]erhaps the greatest restriction on permissible
probation conditions is limited imagination. Appellate cases
abound with the maxim that as long as conditions are suffi-
ciently reasonable and specific, judges have broad latitude in
designing them."376
A number of courts have adopted a three-prong test by
which a court may test the reasonableness of a particular pro-
Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(2)(d) (1991) (explaining that a court may require
the defendant to "[e]nroll, participate and successfully complete designated res-
idential treatment programs for drug, alcohol or mental health problems"); see
also DILLINGHAM ET AL., supra note 244, at 6 (stating that "[clounseling or
treatment programs are frequently instituted" as a condition of probation).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 299-300.
375. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (hold-
ing conditions "should be reasonably related to [probationer's] rehabilitation
and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of
religion") (quoting INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A.B.A., STANDARDS
RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(b) (1970)); State v. Culbertson, 563 P.2d 1224,
1228-29 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the court's discretion is limited by the
requirement that a condition of probation bear "a reasonable relationship to the
treatment of the accused and the protection of the public") (citing Porth v. Tem-
plar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971)); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMIS-
SION, supra note 292, § 5B1.3(b) (noting that probation conditions must be "rea-
sonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant .... the purposes of sentencing... [and] involve
only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary to ef-
fect the purposes of sentencing"); CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 112; Filcik,
supra note 288, at 307 (arguing that "[r]easonableness" is the traditional stan-
dard of review for a probation condition, and thus "[t]he court's discretion is
limited only by the 'reasonableness' requirement"); see also supra note 305.
376. CAMPBELL, supra note 288, at 114. See also, e.g., People v. Dominguez,
64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967) ("The trial court has very wide discretion
in setting the conditions of probation;" however, that discretion is limited by the
requirement that the court exercise its discretion in an impartial manner,
"guided by fixed legal principles, [and] exercised in conformity with the spirit of
the law.") (quoting People v. Wade, 348 P.2d 116, 127 (Cal. 1959)).
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bation condition. The court examines the contested condition
to determine whether it "(1) has no relationship to the crime
of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids con-
duct which is not reasonably related to future criminality."
3 77
A court will declare the condition to be invalid if it meets each
of the three parts of the test.
3 78
If a judge imposed a no-pregnancy condition pursuant to
the proposed legislation, that condition would not meet the
three-prong test of invalidity, and an appellate court would
therefore uphold it as legally valid. The test is conjunctive.
In other words, if any one of the three parts of the test is not
met, a court will hold the condition to be valid. In this partic-
ular case, two of the three parts are not met. First, the condi-
tion does have a relationship to the crime of which the of-
fender was convicted. The probationer's crime is harming a
child in utero through substance use or abuse. The crime oc-
curred because she became pregnant while using alcohol or
illicit substances or began using such substances during her
pregnancy. Thus, since the act of getting pregnant while us-
ing or abusing drugs is directly related to her crime, the no-
pregnancy condition has a direct relationship to the crime. 79
Second, the condition does not require or forbid conduct
that is not reasonably related to future criminality. As dis-
cussed above, if a woman gets pregnant while using or abus-
ing substances, she will harm the child in utero and again
commit a crime. Requiring that the woman not get pregnant
will forestall her from committing any such additional crimes
in the future. Thus, forbidding pregnancy is directly related
to future criminality. 8
There are a limited number of cases in this area. As the
following discussion of these cases demonstrates, however,
377. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See also People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545,
548 (Cal. 1975) (quoting Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293); People v. Pointer,
199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
293); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v.
Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976); State v. Means, 257
N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D. 1977) (quoting Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293).
378. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
379. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (holding that where woman's
extreme diet could adversely affect her children before birth, no-pregnancy con-
dition was reasonably related to the crime of child endangerment).
380. See, e.g., id.
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they support the preceding analysis. The cases also demon-
strate that there is no per se rule as to the validity or invalid-
ity of a no-pregnancy condition. Each case turns on the par-
ticular situation of the probationer and on whether the no-
pregnancy condition relates reasonably to the purpose of the
probation statute.
Only one appellate case exists that bears even a remote
factual similarity to that covered by the proposed legislation.
In People v. Pointer,38 1 the court found that the imposed no-
pregnancy condition was reasonably related to the purpose of
the probation statute. 82 Pointer adhered to, and forced her
two children (ages two and four) to adhere to, a strict macro-
biotic diet.3" 3 After repeated attempts to convince her of the
dangers of the diet to her children, and after one child almost
died, the State charged and convicted Pointer of the felony of
child endangerment. 4 The trial judge sentenced Pointer to
five years' probation under the following conditions: (1) "she
serve one year in county jail; [2] participate in an appropriate
counseling program [3] not be informed of the permanent
whereabouts of [her youngest child] (who was placed in foster
care) and have no unsupervised visits with him [4] have no
custody of any children, including her own, without prior
court approval and [5] that she not conceive during the proba-
tionary period."3 5
The court found that the no-pregnancy condition was
reasonable because it related to the crime of child endanger-
381. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
382. Id. at 364.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 359-60. Section 273a of the California Penal Code encompasses
the crime of child endangerment and provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to pro-
duce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child
to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suf-
fering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or
permits the person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully
causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its per-
son or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for 2, 4, or 6
years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1992).
385. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 360. (upholding all parts of the sentence ex-
cept the mandatory no-pregnancy condition which was reversed on constitu-
tional grounds). See also infra text accompanying notes 411-433.
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ment, of which the defendant was convicted. 6 The court
recognized that "cases in other jurisdictions have concluded
that a condition of probation that a defendant not become
pregnant has no relation to the crime of child abuse or to fu-
ture criminality"; however, it pointed out that the cases relied
heavily upon the fact that the state could avoid the abuse en-
tirely by removing the children from the custody of the de-
fendant.3 87 The same was not, however, true in this particu-
lar case, because the harm that the trial court sought to avoid
could occur before birth if the defendant continued her macro-
biotic diet while pregnant. 88 Since the record demonstrated
that Pointer would continue to adhere to a strict macrobiotic
diet, in spite of the harm that it would cause to an unborn
child, the court found that the no-pregnancy condition was
related to the crime of child endangerment and to the possi-
bility of future criminality.
38 9
Like the situation encompassed by Pointer, the harm of
prenatal drug exposure will occur before birth if the women
involved continue to use drugs. Further, the addicted women
will most likely continue to abuse drugs. As such, a no-preg-
nancy condition is related to the crime of fetal abuse and to
the possibility of future criminality.
In the remaining cases where a no-pregnancy condition
was imposed, the court found that the no-pregnancy condi-
tion of probation was not reasonably related to the purpose of
the probation statute.390 The cases, however, differ radically
from the situation described in the proposed legislation and
are therefore readily distinguishable. In both of the following
cases, the no-pregnancy condition had no direct relationship
to the crime committed.
386. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
387. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
388. Id.
389. Id. The court seemed to assume that the crime of child endangerment
encompasses an unborn child. However, the statute does not specifically pro-
vide protection for an unborn child. If an unborn child is not covered by the
statute, it is difficult to see how the woman's conduct during pregnancy could
relate to the crime of child endangerment or future criminality. Of course, the
court's reasoning in this case would apply to the proposed legislation, since it
applies only to conduct occurring during pregnancy.
390. State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976); State
v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D. 1977) (quoting People v. Dominguez, 64
Cal.Rptr. at 293).
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In Rodriguez v. State,39' the defendant pled nolo con-
tendere to a charge of aggravated child abuse. Among the
conditions of her probation was a no-pregnancy condition.392
The appellate court found the no-pregnancy condition to be
invalid under the three-prong test of reasonableness. 393 It
reasoned that since the trial court prohibited defendant from
having custody of any minor children, the no-pregnancy con-
dition "add[ed] nothing to decrease the possibility of further
child abuse or other criminality."394
The defendant in Thomas v. State395 was convicted of
grand theft and battery after she stole "six gold metal
watches from a department store and ... struggl[ed] with a
store employee and a citizen."396 The appellate court found
that a no-pregnancy condition of Thomas' probation was inva-
lid under the three-prong test of reasonableness.397 The
court, not surprisingly, stated that the special condition was
"grossly erroneous on its face" and fell within the purview of
each one of the three parts of the test.398
2. Constitutional Limitations
In addition to mounting a statutory challenge to the no-
pregnancy condition, probationers would probably challenge
the no-pregnancy condition on constitutional grounds. They
would likely argue that the condition violates a woman's
right to procreate.399 As explained below, such a constitu-
tional challenge is also likely to fail.
391. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
392. Id. at 8.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 10.
395. 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).
396. Id. at 1114.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(characterizing the right to reproduce as "one of the basic civil rights of man").
Some might argue that it would be unconstitutional to offer an offender a
choice between jail and conditional probation. However, if the probation option
is invalidated, then we are essentially saying that the offender's only choice is
jail since it is not practical to allow the offender out in the community with no
conditions attached and the state is not obligated to allow probation. Thus,
while the choice between jail and conditional probation is a difficult one, it is
better than no choice at all, which is the option that would be left if the proba-
tion option was invalidated. See John P. MacKenzie, Whose Choice Is It, Any-
way?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at A22. The proposed legislation presents the
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Traditionally, appellate courts limited their review of
probation conditions to the statutory "reasonableness" stan-
dard and were generally unconcerned with whether the con-
ditions infringed upon any constitutional rights.
4 °° In the
past, courts often justified their unconcern by reasoning that
since probation was a privilege, an "act of grace" by the state,
judges were free to impose any legally authorized conditions
upon the probationer.40 ' If the probationer was concerned
with the limitations placed upon her civil liberties, she could
reject probation and opt for the traditional prison
sentence.402
Although the "grace" theory of probation has lost some of
its popularity,40 3 modem courts still tend to uphold condi-
offender with a real choice. The jail term that the woman can choose will be of
shorter duration than the probation term. In addition, if the offender is jailed,
her right to procreate is also taken away, but, if she is on conditional probation,
at least the loss of the right to procreate is accompanied by liberty and a chance
to put her life together.
400. See Brilliant, supra note 288, at 1376.
401. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 363 n.7 (Ct. App. 1984). The
court cited a line of federal cases that declared:
[Probation was] not a matter of right but a "privilege" or "act of grace"
or "act of clemency." This characterization of probation has repeatedly
been advanced as a reason, usually among others, to indulge the dis-
cretion of a sentencing court to impose conditions that limit constitu-
tional rights. The theory suggests that, since a sentencing court may
completely withhold the benefit of probation, it should therefore be
permitted to encumber the benefit with even the most extreme
conditions.
Id. (citations omitted). See also, e.g., People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352, 353
(Cal. Ct. App. 1936) ("[P]robation is not a right .... It is 'an act of grace and
clemency granted to a deserving defendant whereby he may escape the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands con-
victed.'") (quoting People v. Payne, 289 P. 909, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)); Bril-
liant, supra note 288, at 1366 n. 61 (citing Note, Judicial Review of Probation
Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190 (1967)) (stating "'act of grace' theory
suggests that constitutional limitations upon conditions do not exist if the de-
fendant is granted the privilege of probation").
402. See Blankenship, 61 P.2d at 353-54 (upholding condition that twenty-
three-year-old male submit to a vasectomy, court noted that defendant was not
compelled to submit to the operation; rather, "[h]e was permitted to elect
whether he would comply with the condition and receive the clemency which he
asked or decline ... and accept the penalty which the law provides as punish-
ment for his offense").
403. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.7 ("Although some review-
ing courts continue to give lip service to this [grace] theory, it was repudiated
...by the United States Supreme Court.") (citations omitted). The Pointer
court quoted Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973), where the
Supreme Court stated that "[ilt is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
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tions of probation if they satisfy the "reasonableness" require-
ment, even if the conditions infringe upon constitutional
rights.4 °4 As one commentator has explained, "[w]hether pro-
bation is itself a sentence or it is granted upon suspension of
a sentence, the probationer remains a convicted criminal.
Therefore, probation may include conditions that would fail
to pass constitutional muster if the government attempted to
impose them on the citizenry at large."405
In addition, although another commentator has sug-
gested that the "act-of-grace theory has given way to the 'un-
constitutional conditions' doctrine," this doctrine provides
only that conditions imposed when a court grants a privilege
or gratuity, such as probation, must be reasonable.4 °6 Thus,
because the proposed no-pregnancy condition satisfies the
"reasonableness" requirement, 40 7 a court may uphold the con-
dition, refusing to be swayed by arguments that the condition
infringes upon constitutional rights.
Some courts are, however, more sensitive to constitu-
tional rights in the probation context and apply what one
U.S. 471 (1972), that a probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reli-
ance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935), that probation
is an 'act of grace.'" But see Gilliam v. Los Angeles Mun. Ct., 159 Cal. Rptr. 74,
77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980) ("probation is a privi-
lege and the... [probationer] does not enjoy the full constitutional protection of
persons otherwise situated").
404. See Filcik, supra note 288, at 309 ("Generally, courts will uphold condi-
tions impinging on constitutionally protected rights if the condition is reason-
ably related to the crime committed or the defendant's future criminality."); see
also, e.g., Gilliam, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (holding that since conditions satisfied
the Dominguez reasonableness test, they were valid even though they intruded
on the defendant's constitutional rights).
405. Filcik, supra note 288, at 309.
406. See Brilliant, supra note 288, at 1366 n. 61 (citing Note, Judicial Review
of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190-91 (1967)); see also Wig-
gins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980) ("Under Florida law, consti-
tutionally protected rights can be abridged by conditions of probation if they are
reasonably related to the probationer's past or future criminality or to the reha-
bilitative purposes of probation."); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that "constitutional rights of probationers are limited by
conditions of probation which are desirable for the purposes of rehabilitation,"
and thus the court has "no constitutional difficulty with the [no-pregnancy] con-
dition[ ] imposed, if [it is] otherwise [a] valid condition of probation"); State v.
Culbertson, 563 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (explaining that conditions
on or restrictions of a probationer's civil liberties are allowed as long as the
condition "bear[s] a reasonable relationship to the reformation of the offender or
the protection of the public").
407. See supra text accompanying notes 374-398.
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commentator has labeled "the unconstitutional condition doc-
trine."40 8 This doctrine is exemplified by the ABA Standards,
which provide:
Conditions .. .should be reasonably related to the pur-
poses of sentencing, including the goal of rehabilitation,
and should not be unduly restrictive of the probationer's
liberty or autonomy. Where fundamental rights are in-
volved, special care should be taken to avoid overbroad re-
strictions or restraints which are so vague or ambiguous
as to fail to give real guidance...
At least one court has held that a no-pregnancy condition,
while reasonably related to the purposes of probation, was in-
valid because it unconstitutionally infringed upon the proba-
tioner's right to procreate.4 10
In People v. Pointer,41 1 as previously discussed, the ap-
pellant was convicted of endangering her children by forcing
them to adhere to a macrobiotic diet.412 The judge sentenced
her to probation with a no-pregnancy condition. 413 In this
case, the California court recognized that "the government
may impose conditions of probation which qualify or impinge
upon constitutional rights when circumstances inexorably so
require."4 14 However, the court also found that because a no-
pregnancy clause implicated the fundamental right to pri-
vacy, it would be upheld only if it withstood special scru-
tiny.41 5 More specifically, the condition must be narrowly
drawn, and no alternatives must "exist which are less viola-
tive of a constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so as to
correlate more closely with the purpose contemplated."4
1 6 In
applying this standard, the court found that less onerous al-
ternatives to the no-pregnancy condition existed.41 7 For ex-
ample, "upon becoming pregnant [appellant could] be re-
408. See James C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation
Conditions, 8 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 367, 371 (1982) ("The unconstitutional
condition doctrine, a straightforward principle, serves as the organizing concept
for analyzing probation conditions.").
409. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.3(e)(iii) (2d ed. 1980).
410. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364-66 (Ct. App. 1984).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 360.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 363.
415. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
416. Id. at 365.
417. Id.
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quired to follow an intensive prenatal and neonatal
treatment program monitored by both the probation officer
and by a supervising physician."418 And if she gave birth, the
child could be "removed from her custody and placed in foster
care."
419
With regard to pregnant substance abusers, however,
such alternatives are not feasible. As previously discussed,
many addicted women do not know that they are pregnant
until late in their pregnancy; therefore, a large part of the
harm caused by in utero drug exposure has already occurred.
Further, due to the nature of our foster care system, remov-
ing the child from the woman's care will not generally provide
much added protection for the already damaged child. In or-
der to most effectively protect children from in utero expo-
sure, the state must try to stop as much drug use and abuse
as possible before a child is conceived. The proposed legisla-
tion is the least restrictive and most effective method of
reaching this goal.
In addition, in Pointer the defendant was sentenced to
probation, and the probation conditions were imposed upon
her by the state.42 ° Under the proposed legislation, the de-
fendant is given a clear choice of jail or probation. If she
chooses probation, she also necessarily chooses the probation
conditions. Thus, this is not a situation where the state is
imposing a no-pregnancy condition upon a woman. She is
given a choice, albeit a difficult choice. As such, the no-preg-
nancy condition does not infringe upon the woman's funda-
mental right to procreate, because such an infringement oc-
curs only where there is state action. Here, the woman is
consciously waiving her right to procreate for the length of
her probation term.
V. Policy Concerns Relating to Probable Discriminatory
Impact of the Proposed Legislation
While this author is wary of the "slippery slope" and the
potential horror of Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's
Tale,421 she believes that intelligent people can restrict legis-
418. Id.
419. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
420. Id. at 360.
421. MARGARET ELEANOR ATwOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986) (the state
designated certain women to bear children and regulated their pregnancies).
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lation so as to avoid the slide down the slope. Our society
must be wary of letting our legitimate fears freeze us into in-
action that leads to harm to others. Currently, scholars are
bouncing around the moral, constitutional, and philosophical
dilemmas in the prenatal drug exposure area like so many
balls. It is not likely that the dilemmas will be resolved in the
near future; and while we sit in our pristine, drug-free, afflu-
ent ivory towers, trying to resolve the dilemma, drug-affected
babies are being born and abandoned in droves. What is
needed now is less debate and more action.
That is not to say that the complex issues in this area are
not important. They are. However, they have been discussed
thoroughly and will continue to be discussed. While the au-
thor has her own biases with regard to these issues, discus-
sion of them is not the purpose of this article. Rather, the
author's purpose is to propose a workable, realistic solution to
a serious problem. This article proposes a solution with a
bias toward protecting the exposed fetus, but also recognizes
the need to place limitations to avoid having the solution
taken up and abused by persons whose interests are actively
hostile to the equality interests of women and minorities.
422
One policy issue is significant enough to warrant discus-
sion. There is a real concern among minorities that legisla-
tion of the type proposed will allow the dominant culture to
control their reproduction again. 4 23 For African-Americans,
memories of such control during slavery and beyond remain
clear and vivid. In addition, there is a correlative concern
that such a proposal constitutes the eugenics movement all
424over again.
422. The author also recognizes that large numbers of children are being
harmed by "exposure to hazardous chemicals." Oberman, supra note 159, at
511. A lot of this harm takes place in the workplace; such harms, however, are
beyond the scope of this article.
423. See Nolan, supra note 83, at 20.
When criminal prosecution takes the place of treatment and support,
the symbolism that emerges is not only that women should not use
drugs while pregnant, but that women who use drugs should not be-
come pregnant. Since drug use is correlated with socioeconomic status
and therefore with racial background, pursuing a criminal justice ap-
proach will obviously have a disparate impact on black and Hispanic as
opposed to white communities.
Id.
424. Eugenics (i.e., selective breeding), led to government sterilization of
prisoners, blacks, and immigrants. See generally, Patricia A. King, Helping Wo-
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One response to such concerns is that the problem of
substance-abusing pregnant women cuts across all socioeco-
nomic levels.4 25 Therefore, the legislation is not intended to
target only poor and/or minority women. However, although
the legislation is not designed to target poor and minority wo-
men, given a past history of discriminatory report-
ing by hospitals of substance abuse,426 it is likely that this
legislation will disparately impact poor and minority
women. 427
The solution to the problem of discriminatory reporting
and discriminatory enforcement of the proposed legislation
lies not in prohibiting the passage of such legislation.
Rather, it lies in addressing the discrimination itself.
Mandatory reporting needs to be "based on objective medical
criteria."428 "It is clear that standards based on medical crite-
men Helping Children: Drug Policy and Future Generations: Confronting Drug
Policy: Part 2, 69 MILBANK Q., Dec. 22, 1991, at 595
425. In a NAPARE "survey of 36 hospitals across the country," researchers
found that use of drugs by pregnant women "was not confined to urban areas or
particular racial or socioeconomic groups." Fink, supra note 24, at 2-3 (citations
omitted); see also Logli, supra note 140, at 24.
Further, a population-based study in Pinellas County, Florida, conducted
in 1989 by NAPARE, indicated that "the overall prevalence of drug or alcohol
use ... was similar among women who received care from private physicians
and those cared for at public health clinics, [and that] ... the rate of substance
abuse by pregnant women... was similar for whites and blacks." Ira J. Chas-
noff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (1990).
426. The 1989 NAPARE study conducted in Pinellas County, Florida, see
supra note 426, demonstrated that poor and African-American women in Pinel-
las County were much more likely to be reported to health authorities for sub-
stance abuse during pregnancy. Chasnoff et al., Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra
note 32, at 1205-06. "During the six-month period [of the study] during preg-
nancy." Id. at 1202. From this sample the doctors learned that African-Ameri-
can women were "9.6 times more likely than.., white wom[e]n to be reported,
[and]... poor women were more likely than others to be reported." Id. at 1204,
1202. This racial difference in reporting persisted even when the numbers were
analyzed in terms of whether the women received private or public health care.
Id. Only 44% of the women at the public health center were African-American,
yet 67% of the women reported from these centers were African-American. Id.
In addition, while less than 10% of the women at private offices were African-
American, 55% of those reported from private offices were African-American.
Id. at 1204.
427. See Rinkel, supra note 12, at 1 ("[Bliases in testing and reporting...
inaccurately suggest that more minority than white women abuse drugs during
pregnancy and that prenatal substance abuse is largely restricted to lower so-
cioeconomic urban populations.").
428. Chasnoff et al., Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 32, at 1202.
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ria for the identification of intrauterine drug or alcohol expo-
sure must be an integral part of all state legislation, espe-
cially when the reporting of such cases is required by state
law."429 Reporting laws similar to Florida's should be
avoided. Florida's regulation requires only that the person
reporting have a "'reasonable cause to suspect' maternal
drug or alcohol use. "43 Such a vague criterion "can lead to
variations in reporting" and allows for discriminatory
reporting.4 31
Even if, despite all our efforts, the legislation is applied
-in a discriminatory fashion, this is not necessarily a negative
result. While the use of crack is "not confined to any race or
class, the popularity of crack among poor minority women
has had particularly devastating effects."432 Such effects are
due to the fact that, according to the 1980 census, seventy
percent of families in the poorest one-third of the African-
American community are headed by women.433 Since paren-
tal drug abuse is often thought to "correlate[ ] to some degree
with child neglect,"434 the state will often take custody of the
children, thus putting them into the overburdened foster care
system.435
Thus, without some intervention, the African-American
community will continue in the ever-escalating cycle of drug
use and abuse and all of its associated evils. This cycle in-
creasingly wreaks havoc upon the African-American commu-
nity, threatening the continued viability of the community.
Of course, even with the above concerns the author
would not advocate most forms of governmental intervention,
especially since, in the author's opinion, the legislation would
be administered primarily by non-minority, middle-class in-
dividuals. However, it must be kept in mind that the pro-
posed legislation is designed to be beneficial rather than pu-
nitive. Implementation of the proposed legislation, coupled
with comprehensive drug treatment, prenatal care, and
parenting classes, would allow minority and poor women to
429. Id. at 1206.
430. Id. at 1205
431. Id.
432. Fink, supra note 24, at 2 (footnote omitted).
433. Id.
434. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 90, at 766.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 119-139, 259-261.
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work to retain the child or children they already have and to
have a good chance of later having healthy, substance-free
children.
Unless all aspects of the proposed legislation and the
larger plan are put in place, (if, for example, legislators tried
to use the no-pregnancy component by itself), the balance
would be tipped in the other direction and the policy concerns
previously outlined would weigh against such legislation. If,
however, society allocates the necessary resources, the pro-
posed legislation is the best method of protecting as many
children as possible from drug exposure and doing so as soon
as possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
Millions of children have been, are being, and will con-
tinue to be harmed by prenatal drug exposure. The time for
debate on what to do to alleviate the problem is long past. An
effective solution needs to be implemented. All previously
proposed alternatives lack one or more important features.
The proposed legislation fills this gap and, as a result, is the
best way to protect as many children as possible from any
harm. It is designed to do so as soon as possible and with the
least amount of infringement on a woman's rights as is possi-
ble under the circumstances. The proposed legislation will
infringe upon some rights; however, in deciding which inter-
ests predominate, the balance weighs heavily in favor of the
unborn child who cannot protect himself rather than in favor
of the woman who is ingesting harmful substances and who,
although she might be a victim herself, has at least some con-
trol over whether to engage in the prohibited conduct.
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